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THREE ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF CONSUMER DECISION 
MAKING: SOCIAL PRESENCE, SOCIAL POWER, AND SOCIAL PREDICTION 
  
Didem Kurt, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2012 
 
 
 
Previous research suggests that social influence and social prediction (i.e., how would others 
behave in a similar situation?) can have a profound impact on individuals’ consumption patterns. 
Despite the popularity of the social aspect of decision making in consumer research, there are 
certain topics that received very little attention to date. In my dissertation, I explore three such 
underresearched topics, namely (1) the effect of the presence of an accompanying friend on 
consumer spending, (2) the impact of social power on financial risk taking, and (3) the accuracy 
of social predictions in the context of endowment. Each essay addresses an issue that either 
stems from the difference in individuals’ focus on the self versus others (Essays 1 and 2) or is a 
manifestation of the self-other difference (Essay 3).  
 My first essay documents that agentic consumers spend more when they shop with a 
friend as compared to when they shop alone, whereas the amount spent by communal consumer 
is about the same regardless of whether they shop with a friend. I attribute this to the notion that 
agentic consumers are self-focused and strive for status and thus, engage in self-promotion 
through increased spending while shopping with friends. On the other hand, spending more to 
impress a friend is not consistent with the modest nature of communal consumers, leading them 
to keep their spending under control in the presence of a friend. 
v 
 
 My second essay demonstrates that having power versus lacking power over others 
increases financial risk taking among agentic, but not communal, individuals. I explain this 
finding with the notion that self-oriented individuals associate power with self-interest goals, 
whereas other-oriented individuals associate power with responsibility goals. That is, since 
increased wealth can fortify agentic individuals’ powerful position and help them maintain their 
status, they tend to make risky financial decisions when they experience a state of power. 
However, taking risks with the goals of enhancing financial position and maintaining the status 
associated with power is inconsistent with communal goals. Mediation analysis provides support 
for the proposed underlying mechanism.  
 Finally, my third essay examines whether consumers accurately predict how valuable an 
object would be to other consumers. Building on research in several domains including affective 
psychology of value, empathy gaps, and social prediction, I propose and find that owners 
underestimate the average selling price stated by other owners, whereas buyers overestimate the 
average buying price stated by other buyers. I attribute this to a self-other difference in the value 
function arising from empathy gaps. Accordingly, I find that the documented effects are 
attenuated when either an external influence (e.g., similarity priming) or one’s high cognitive and 
emotional ability to connect with others helps reduce empathy gaps. 
 Taken together, my dissertation examines the social aspect of consumer decision making 
from three different perspectives that are closely related to consumers’ welfare and well-being: 
(1) the costly influence of friends’ presence in the market place, (2) the propensity to take higher 
financial risk due to the possession of social power, and (3) the biased predictions of the 
valuations of other consumers. I discuss in depth the theoretical and practical implications of my 
dissertation.    
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1.0     INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Human beings are social creatures whose preferences and consumption decisions are shaped 
through their interactions with those around them. Every day consumers buy and use products 
that are observable to others. Thus, consumers are social actors whose decisions and choices 
have the potential to influence and be influenced by other consumers. Accordingly, considerable 
amount of research has been devoted to understand the social aspect of consumer decision 
making. This stream of literature suggests that social influence and social prediction (i.e., how 
would others behave in a similar situation?) can have a profound impact on individuals’ 
consumption patterns.  
Early studies of the social influence on consumer behavior find that consumers’ brand 
choices and product evaluations are influenced by informal social groups as individuals exhibit 
tendency to conform the group norm (e.g., Stafford 1966; Venkatesan 1966). Other studies 
document that consumers rely heavily on others’ product evaluations as a source of information 
about the product (e.g., Cohen and Golder 1972; Burnkrant and Cousineau 1975). However, 
social influence on consumer decision making has been shown to vary across product categories 
(Witt 1969; Witt and Bruce 1972) and depend on whether the product is privately or publicly 
consumed (Bearden and Etzel 1982; Childers and Rao 1992).   
More recently, researchers have explored different dimensions of social influence in the 
shopping and consumption contexts such as the impact of public scrutiny on consumers’ variety 
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seeking behavior (Rather and Kahn 2002) and the group influence in a sequential choice setting 
(Ariely and Levav 2000; Quester and Steyer 2010). Others have demonstrated the effect of social 
presence in the market place on consumers’ emotions and product choices (Dahl, Manchanda, 
and Argo 2001; Argo, Dahl, and Manchanda 2005), coupon redemption behavior (Argo and 
Main 2008), food consumption (McFerran et al. 2010), and tendency to shop at a particular 
section of a store (Hui, Bradlow, and Fader 2009). While the majority of research to date has 
studied the impact of social influence in a rather non-descript fashion (i.e., it has studied public 
versus private settings), the impact of the specific source of the influence is not as clear. This is 
an important void to address as it seems that impression management concerns may be very 
different if the shopper is standing in the store aisle with a friend versus a stranger (as studied in 
Argo et al. 2005).  My first essay attempts to address this research gap. 
Another dimension of social influence that has been shown to determine individuals’ 
consumption and spending patterns is social power. Lacking power versus having power 
increases consumers’ willingness to pay for products associated with status (Rucker and 
Galinsky 2008, 2009) and leads them to spend more money on others than on themselves 
(Rucker, Dubois, and Galinsky 2011). Given these significant effects of experiencing high versus 
low power on consumers’ welfare, it is important to investigate other channels (e.g., financial 
risk taking) through which social power can influence consumers’ spending behavior, which is 
the focus of my second essay. 
Social comparison has also been recognized by consumer researchers as an important 
factor determining consumer behavior (e.g., Moschis 1976; Bearden and Rose 1990).  For 
instance, comparisons among consumers impact not only their conspicuous consumption 
tendency (Ordabayeva and Chandon 2011) but also their propensity to lie about their purchases 
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(Argo, White, and Dahl 2006). Further, Hamilton, Ratner, and Thompson (2011) find that people 
are more interested in buying and using a product when they believe that others would use the 
product less frequently than themselves. Although consumers often compare themselves with 
others and these comparisons shape their decisions, they seem to be not well calibrated about 
actual preferences of others who are in the same situation as themselves. People tend to 
mispredict how others would behave in various situations such as financial risk taking (Hsee and 
Weber 1997; Faro and Rottenstreich 2006) and public embarrassment (Van Boven, Loewenstein, 
and Dunning 2005). Given that individuals’ behaviors are guided, at least in part, by their 
perceptions of others’ behaviors in a similar situation, biased social predictions are expected to 
influence their consumption patterns (potentially in a harmful way), an issue that has not 
received much attention among consumer researchers. In view of that, my third essay focuses on 
consumers’ endowment related social predictions.  
As mentioned above, despite the popularity of the social aspect of decision making in 
consumer research, there are certain topics that received very little attention to date. In my 
dissertation, I explored three such underresearched topics, namely (1) the effect of the presence 
of an accompanying friend on consumer spending, (2) the impact of social power on financial 
risk taking, and (3) the accuracy of social predictions in the context of endowment.   
 
 
 
1.1     SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 1 
 
 
In my first essay, I examine how the presence of a friend in the market place influences how 
much consumers spend during a particular shopping trip. I propose that shopping with friends 
activates impression management concerns, leading consumers to adjust their spending to 
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conform to the expectations that their friends have of them. Across multiple studies, I document 
that agentic consumers (i.e., males) spend more when they shop with a friend as compared to 
when they shop alone, whereas the amount spent by communal consumers (i.e., females) is about 
the same regardless of whether they shop with a friend. I attribute this finding to the notion that 
agentic consumers strive for status and power (Bakan 1966) and thus, engage in self-promotion 
through increased spending while shopping with friends. On the other hand, spending more to 
impress a friend is not consistent with the modest nature of communion-oriented consumers, 
leading them to keep their spending under control in the presence of a friend.  
Consistent with my impression management explanation, I also find that friends are 
especially influential for consumers high in self-monitoring, although the effects work in 
opposite directions for agentic and communal consumers. While agentic consumers high in self-
monitoring spend more with a friend, communal consumers with high self-monitoring spend less 
when accompanied by a friend. Finally, these findings appear to be spending context dependent 
as I also document that when the spending is for a good cause (i.e., donating to a charity), 
communal consumers with high self-monitoring loosen their purse strings in the presence of a 
friend versus alone, while donation behavior of agentic consumers is not influenced by an 
accompanying friend. 
 
 
 
1.2 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 2 
 
 
Although social power has long been recognized by social scientists as a determinant of human 
behavior, it is not until recently that researchers have started to examine its impact on 
individuals’ consumption and spending patterns (e.g., Rucker and Galinsky 2008; Rucker et al. 
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2011). In my second essay, I investigate an alternative channel through which social power can 
influence consumers’ welfare and well-being―financial risk taking. I propose that the impact of 
social power on consumers’ financial risk taking is not simple but contingent on their agency-
communion orientation (Bakan 1966).  
Consistent with my thesis, I document that having power versus lacking power over 
others leads to greater financial risk taking when individuals are agency-oriented but not 
communion-oriented. I attribute this to the notion that agentic individuals associate power with 
self-interest goals aimed at enhancing one’s wealth and status, while communal individuals link 
power with responsibility goals. Accordingly, when self-benefit obtained from the risky decision 
is low versus high, the effect of social power on agentic individuals’ financial risk taking 
tendency is reversed (i.e., they take less risk). I also find that pursuit of self-interest goals 
mediates the interactive influence of power and agency-communion orientation on financial risk 
taking.    
 
 
 
1.3 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 3 
 
 
In my third essay, I investigate whether consumers accurately predict how valuable an object 
would be to other consumers in the same role (i.e., owners or buyers). Building on research in 
several domains including affective psychology of value (e.g., Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004) and 
social prediction (e.g., Van Boven and Loewenstein 2005), I propose that intrarole empathy gaps 
impair consumers’ perspective taking in the context of endowment, resulting in a self-other 
difference in the value function and thereby preventing them from accurately predicting others’ 
valuations. Further, since owners and buyers tend to focus on what each stands to forgo in the 
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potential exchange—the object and the money, respectively— (Carmon and Ariely 2000), I 
contend that the self-other gap in valuation manifests itself in opposite directions between the 
two groups. 
Across multiple studies, I find that owners underestimate the average selling price stated 
by other owners, whereas buyers overestimate the average buying price stated by other buyers. In 
addition, consistent with my prediction built on the self-other gap in valuation, I document that 
increased perceived similarity between the self and the target people attenuates the bias in 
owners’ and buyers’ predictions of valuations of others in the same role. I also find that greater 
perspective taking (i.e., the cognitive capacity to consider the world from others’ viewpoints) is 
associated with lower estimation errors when participants are high, but not low, in empathy (i.e., 
the ability to connect emotionally with other individuals). 
 
 
   
1.4     CONTRIBUTION 
 
 
Taken together, my dissertation examines the social aspect of consumer decision making from 
three different perspectives that are closely related to consumers’ welfare and well-being: (1) the 
costly influence of friends’ presence in the market place, (2) the propensity to take higher 
financial risk due to the possession of social power, (3) the biased predictions of the valuations 
of other consumers. The findings of my dissertation further our current understanding of the 
social influence on individuals’ consumption and spending behavior in several important ways.   
First, prior research suggests that friends influence consumers’ purchase decisions in a 
positive way by providing information related to the product (Urbany et al. 1989). My first essay 
extends this research by demonstrating that friends in the market place can also have deleterious 
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implications for a shopper’s wallet, as agentic shoppers spend more when they are accompanied 
by a friend as opposed to when they shop alone. Second, my dissertation extends the recent work 
on the role of social power in consumer behavior in that I find agentic consumers experiencing a 
state of power tend to make riskier financial decisions to enhance their wealth and status. Third, 
my research contributes to the literature on social predictions by documenting that consumers 
fail to accurately predict how endowment and lack of ownership impact preferences and choices 
of others consumers, which may lead them to engage in suboptimal transactions (e.g., a buyer 
who tends to overestimate other buyers’ valuations may overbid for an house). Finally, the 
findings of my dissertation also add to the nascent literature examining how agency-communion 
orientation impacts consumers’ financial decisions (e.g., He, Inman, and Mittal 2008; Winterich, 
Mittal, and Ross 2009).  
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2.0     ESSAY 1: THE INFLUENCE OF FRIENDS ON CONSUMER SPENDING: 
THE ROLE OF AGENCY-COMMUNION AND SELF-MONITORING 
 
 
 
 
Social influences play a pervasive role in shaping consumers’ affect, cognitions and behaviors 
(e.g., Argo, Dahl, and Manchanda 2005; Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo 2001; Ratner and Kahn 
2002). To date, behavioral researchers have studied the impact of several social characteristics to 
determine the likelihood and the extent to which the social context will be influential. For 
instance, while high levels of attractiveness and credibility of a salesperson have been shown to 
enhance the effectiveness of an influence attempt (e.g., Argo, Dahl, and Morales 2008), high 
levels of persuasion knowledge and cognitive capacity on the part of consumers have been 
shown to inoculate them from such an influence (e.g., Campbell and Kirmani 2000). 
Since occurrences of social influence are not always readily apparent or intentional, it 
seems likely that consumers may not always be prepared to draw from their repertoire of 
protective strategies to shield themselves from the influence. An example of such an occurrence 
may be when the social influence arises from an unexpected source such as other shoppers 
present in the store. Indeed, Argo et al. (2005) find that the mere physical presence of another 
shopper in a store aisle is sufficient to elicit emotional and behavioral responses in consumers 
that benefit the retail establishment. In the present research, we aim to push the envelope even 
further to determine whether the presence of a friend can also create an unintentional cost to the 
consumer when in the marketplace. We use the term “friend” to refer to relationships ranging 
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from the stage where the two parties like each other and seek out each other’s company to the 
stage of friendly relations (Price and Arnould 1999). Research indicates that the behavioral 
implications of the interaction between two parties such as compliance to a request, tend to be 
similar across this range (e.g., Burger et al. 2001; Dolinski, Nawrat, and Rudak 2001). 
In general, we predict and find that consumers’ spending decisions are influenced by 
accompanying friends due to consumers’ impression management concerns. Importantly, we find 
that the direction of a friend’s effect on consumer spending is moderated by the consumer’s 
agency-communion orientation (i.e., the tendency to focus on the self or others; Bakan 1966).1
Our research contributes to the social influence literature by extending our understanding 
of the impact of friends in consumption. Foremost, the limited research that has studied a 
friend’s influence assessed respondents’ perceptions of an imaginary shopper’s likelihood of 
 
That is, agentic consumers (i.e., males) spend more when they shop with a friend as compared to 
when they shop alone, whereas communal consumers (i.e., females) are more likely to control 
their shopping while in the presence of a friend. We also find that this interactive effect is 
moderated by individual differences in self-monitoring such that friends are especially influential 
for consumers who are high in self-monitoring, albeit the effects occur in opposite directions for 
agency- and communion-oriented consumers (i.e.,  agentic (communal) consumers spend more 
(less) when shopping with a friend). Finally, consistent with our impression management 
explanation, we find that the interactive effect of a friend’s presence, agency-communion 
orientation, and self-monitoring is reversed when consumers make a donation to a charity. 
Communion-primed individuals with high self-monitoring donate more when accompanied by a 
friend than when they are alone, while this effect is not observed for agency-primed individuals.  
                                                 
1 Agency/communion and agentic/communal are used to refer to the same concepts in the literature, so we use them 
interchangeably.   
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making unplanned purchases and spending more money in the context of hypothetical shopping 
situations (Luo 2005). The use of such an artificial methodology is questionable, especially in 
light of the fact that typical influence agents are salespeople and marketers (Friestad and Wright 
1994); thus, consumers may not be cognizant of the extent to which their friends may influence 
their spending behaviors. Therefore, we study consumers’ behavior both in actual shopping 
settings (i.e., mass merchandise stores, a bookstore, and a mall) and an experimental setting. 
Second, we contribute to social influence research (e.g., Argo et al. 2005; Luo 2005; Ratner and 
Kahn 2002) by showing that the effect of the social environment (i.e., presence vs. absence of a 
friend) on consumer spending is qualified by individual differences in agency-communion 
orientations. We achieve this by (a) using gender as a proxy for agency-communion orientation 
in the pilot study and Study 1, (b) measuring the orientations directly via an individual difference 
scale in Study 2, and (c) priming the orientations in Study 3. Next, we present our conceptual 
development. We then define the models used to test our hypotheses and report the results from a 
pilot and three studies. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results and 
directions for future research.  
 
 
 
2.1     CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Social influence has been described as one of the primary factors that affect consumers’ 
decisions. In fact, Yang and Allenby (2003, p.291) suggest that: “…people live in a world in 
which they are interconnected, information is shared, recommendations are made and social 
acceptance is important.” Based on this, it is not surprising that the research studying social 
influence has found that the social environment can shape and sometimes misconstrue 
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consumers’ opinions, preferences, and choice behaviors as they strive for social acceptance (e.g., 
Argo et al. 2005; Bearden and Etzel 1982; Dahl et al. 2001; Ratner and Kahn 2002). To 
illustrate, Ariely and Levav (2000) find that consumer choices made in group contexts differ 
systematically from those made in private consumption contexts, as the choices made in the 
former setting provide an opportunity for them to engage in impression management efforts. 
Netemeyer, Bearden, and Teel (1992, p.381) note that, “…in purchasing and using products, 
people are social actors whose behavior is open to observation of others…individuals use 
products as a form of impression management to influence the ascriptions others might make 
about them (i.e., form favorable attributions).”  
While the majority of research to date has studied the impact of social influence in a 
rather non-descript fashion (i.e., it has studied public versus private settings), the impact of the 
specific source of the influence is not as clear. This is an important void to address as it seems 
that impression management concerns may be very different if the shopper is standing in the 
store aisle with a friend versus a stranger (as studied in Argo et al. 2005). Consistent with this 
expectation, research has shown that the presence of friends (as compared to when the shopper is 
alone) can be highly influential, serving as not only sources of information related to the product 
(e.g., Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie 1989), but also as activators of impression management 
concerns on the part of the consumers (e.g., Childers and Rao 1992). However, extending 
previous research, we argue that the influence of an accompanying friend on consumers’ 
shopping decisions and spending is moderated by consumers’ agency/communion orientation 
since agentic and communal individuals are socialized differently regarding the relative 
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emphasis placed on self- and other-oriented goals (Bakan 1966; Eagly 1987), leading them to 
have different impression management concerns in the presence of their friends.2
Originally coined by Bakan (1966), the terms agency and communion capture the notion 
that people possess two fundamental modalities. In their most simplistic forms, agency refers to a 
tendency to reflect on one’s individuality and emphasizes the self and its separation from other 
organisms whereas communion refers to the merging of an individual in a larger organism and 
social relationships and connections with others (Helgeson 1994). Wiggins (1991) construes 
agency as one’s strivings for status and power that facilitate and protect the differentiation of the 
individual from others, whereas communion arises from strivings for cooperation and harmony 
that protect the unity of the individual with a social entity. Accordingly, research has shown that 
agency involves such qualities as instrumentality, self-confidence, and competence, whereas 
communion involves such qualities as cooperativeness, concern for others, and kindness (e.g., 
Eagly 1987). Furthermore, due to differences in their socialization processes, agency-oriented 
individuals enjoy putting themselves, their pleasures, and their activities at center stage, whereas 
communion-oriented individuals refrain from doing so (Bakan 1966).  
  
The usefulness of agency-communion orientations in understanding human behavior has 
been explored in different domains such as consumers’ responses to persuasive information 
(Meyers-Levy 1988), financial risk taking (He, Inman, and Mittal 2008), and donation behavior 
(Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). To better understand why consumers’ spending behavior in 
the presence of their friends should be influenced by their agency-communion orientation, we 
draw from the stereotype literature. This work has found that individuals are motivated to 
                                                 
2 Previous research (e.g., Funder and Colvin 1988; Stinson and Ickes 1992) points out that unlike strangers, our 
friends have a history of prior interaction with us and develop a store of knowledge regarding our personalities. 
Thus, the presence of friends provides people with both the opportunity and the motivation to conform to the 
expectations their friends have of them, which would bring about social rewards and help avoid social sanctions.  
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conform to the stereotypic expectations that other people hold about their behavior (e.g., 
Rosenthal and Rubin 1978). Such a motivation exists because while conforming to stereotypic 
expectations can produce rewards of social approval, violating these expectations risks social 
sanctions. For instance, in the gender domain, females who violate stereotypic expectations by 
engaging in behaviors typically regarded as masculine (i.e., self-promotion) are rated 
significantly lower in terms of their social attractiveness (Rudman 1998). Relatedly, research on 
the “feminine modesty effect” (e.g., Gould and Slone 1982) has shown that in response to 
normative pressures, females tend to be modest in public contexts. In contrast, society deems it 
normative and acceptable for males to engage in self-promotion (e.g., Miller et al. 1992). 
Research by Eagly (1987) and Jost and Kay (2005) suggests that agentic stereotypes (e.g., 
ambitious, assertive, and competent) and communal stereotypes (e.g., warm, considerate, and 
modest) begin to emerge in childhood and are widely held and persistent. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to expect that these stereotypes would result in different objectives in a social 
situation and subsequently the use of different self-presentation strategies. There are two specific 
self-presentation strategies that seem applicable to the present context. The first strategy is 
acquisitive, which focuses on gaining valued outcomes and involves exerting effort to gain 
admiration, respect and attention of peers by presenting the self in the most favorable light 
(Arkin 1981). The second strategy is protective, which is adopted to avoid negative outcomes  
and is associated with “self-presentations that are cautious, modest, and designed to avoid 
attention” (Schelenker and Weigold 1992, p. 147; see also Wolfe, Lennox and Cutler’s (1986) 
distinction between self-presentations aimed at “getting ahead” of others versus “getting along” 
with others). 
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Based on our conceptual framework, we argue that to conform to the expectations that 
their friends have of them, agency-oriented consumers will adopt the acquisitive self-
presentation style (i.e., “getting ahead”) while shopping with friends and engage in self-
promotion through increased spending. However, spending more to impress a friend is not 
consistent with the modest nature of communion-oriented consumers. Thus, they are expected to 
adopt the protective self-presentation style (i.e., “getting along”) in the presence of a friend and 
will control their spending. While this suggests that communal consumers are not expected to 
spend more when shopping with a friend, it does not mean that they will decrease their spending. 
In particular, decreased spending in the presence of a friend represents self-neglect (i.e., focusing 
on others at the expense of the self) or “self-depreciation” and not all communal individuals have 
the skills or tendency to perform such behavior (Buss 1990; Fritz and Helgeson 1998). Thus, we 
do not predict a systematic decline in the spending of communal consumers when they are 
accompanied by a friend. Rather, we argue that the positive impact of a friend’s presence on 
agentic consumers’ spending will not be observed in the case of communal consumers. Formally: 
H1: Agency-oriented, but not communion-oriented, consumers will spend more when they 
shop with a friend than when they shop alone. 
 
 
 
 
2.2     PILOT STUDY 
 
 
The Point of Purchase Advertising Institute (POPAI) periodically conducts field studies of 
consumers’ purchasing behavior. POPAI fielded its most recent study in 1995 and provided the 
data for the present analysis. In-store intercept interviews were conducted at fourteen mass 
merchandise stores. Consumers were intercepted randomly as they entered the store and were 
asked several questions. After respondents finished shopping, they returned to the interviewer 
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who collected their receipt and assessed demographics. The key dependent variable in the study 
was the amount of money spent by the participants. Data were collected from 1230 customers, 
12 of which were excluded from the analysis due to missing responses. We also excluded 10 
extreme observations identified based on studentized residuals, Cook’s D, and hat diagonal.3 Of 
the 1208 usable respondents, 555 shopped alone and 72 were accompanied by a friend.4
Based on previous research (e.g., He et al. 2008; Winterich et al. 2009), agency-
communion orientation was operationalized as gender in this study (78% of respondents were 
female). Gender is a reasonable proxy for the orientation since Bakan (1966) suggests, and 
research has demonstrated (for review see Guimond et al. 2006), that agency orientation is more 
characteristic of males whereas communion orientation tends to pertain to females.    
  
Data were analyzed using OLS regression where the dependent variable was the natural 
log of the dollar amount spent by the respondent.5
                                                 
3 These observations were deemed outliers due to the extremeness of the magnitude of their dependent variable (i.e., 
very low or very high actual spending as compared to that predicted by the model). For instance, 6 participants spent 
less than $1.50.  Since such observations have undue impact on the estimated coefficients and their standard errors  
(as well as on the overall fit of the model), excluding them enables us to avoid reporting potentially misleading 
results driven by the presence of a few outliers in the dataset. Note that the pattern of results is similar when we run 
the analysis without excluding these outliers. We perform the same outlier diagnostics in other studies as well and 
add a note if we exclude any outliers.    
 Contrast coding was used for our two focal 
independent variables of gender (1 if male, -1 if female) and friend (1 if with friend, -1 if not 
accompanied by a friend). We controlled for a variety of factors that could potentially affect 
consumers’ spending, such as the amount of money that they planned to spend, the amount of 
time they spent in the store, and the method they used to pay for their purchases (Inman, Winer, 
and Ferraro 2009). In addition, social variables were also included in the model to control for the 
impact of other types of relationships (e.g., spouse) and multiple accompaniers (Latané 1981; 
4 Accompaniers are categorized into eight groups: friend (72), spouse (138), parent (42), child (298), someone else’s 
child (48), adult family member (48), someone else (19), unknown (156); 229 shoppers were accompanied by more 
than one person.  
5 In the model, we control for the amount of money that the shoppers planned to spend. Our results remain 
unchanged when we use the difference between actual and planned spending as the dependent variable.  
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please refer to the Appendix A for details of the model specification, summary statistics, and the 
complete regression results).  
The overall regression model is significant (F(25, 1182) = 45.24, p < .01) and the model 
R2 is 48.9%. We find a significant and positive main effect for friend (β2 = 0.12, p < .05). 
Importantly, this main effect is qualified by a positive and significant interaction between friend 
and gender (β18 = 0.15, p < .01). That is, controlling for planned spending, male (i.e., agentic) 
consumers spend 56% more when they shop with a friend than when they shop alone, while 
female (i.e., communal) consumers spend 4% less when they shop with a friend than when they 
shop alone, albeit this latter difference is not significant. This result provides initial support for 
our hypothesis. The interaction effect is visually depicted in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Moderating Effect of Gender on the Relationship between Presence of a Friend and 
Consumers’ Spending 
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The results also reveal that the main effects for the other relationship categories are not 
significant (p’s > .17). More importantly, none of the interactions between gender and other 
social influence categories are significant (p’s > .16), implying that males (i.e., agentic) and 
females (i.e., communal) do not exhibit differential sensitivity to social influence stemming from 
sources other than their friends. One key limitation of the pilot study is that the classification of 
the “friend” was provided by participants and thus, it is a subjective perception. To address this 
limitation, in Study 1 we manipulate the friend’s presence via a trained confederate assuming the 
role of a friend that is present during a shopping trip. 
 
 
 
2.3     STUDY 1 
 
 
2.3.1     Method 
 
 
Study 1 uses a retail shopping setting to test a 2 (orientation: agency vs. communion) x 2 (social 
presence: alone vs. accompanying friend) between-subjects experimental design. The key 
dependent variable is amount spent. Orientation was again operationalized as participants’ 
gender. Eighty-seven undergraduate students (43 males and 44 females) from a large North 
American university completed the study.   
Procedure. Participants took part in what ostensibly were two unrelated studies. In the 
first study, participants were run in groups of two or three. In half of the groups, unknown to 
participants, a confederate assumed the role of one of the study participants.6
                                                 
6 To control for potential impact of gender match/mismatch between the confederate and participants, two 
confederates (one female, one male) were used in the study and participants were randomly assigned to each 
confederate. As we discuss in the results section, neither the gender of the confederate nor the gender 
match/mismatch between the confederate and participants impacts our results.     
 The goal of the 
confederate was to become acquainted with the actual participants. This was achieved by having 
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the researcher leave the participants and the confederate alone for an extended period of time 
(i.e., she went to photocopy more surveys). The confederate followed a script to both initiate and 
maintain a conversation with the participants during the researcher’s absence. Upon the 
researcher’s return, the confederate responded to the same survey as the participants. Within the 
next couple of days, participants individually completed a second study that took place at the 
university student center. Upon arrival they were informed that the purpose of the study was to 
collect marketing research information for the university bookstore and that to do this they would 
be asked to go to the store, make a product purchase, and then return to the experimenter to 
complete a short survey. They were further told that to determine which product they would 
purchase, they would select an envelope that contained the name of a product under $5.00.  
Unknown to the participants, each of the envelopes identified a package of four AA 
batteries as the product to purchase. Participants were given $5.00 and told that they could keep 
both the product and any remaining change from the purchase. Participants then went to the 
bookstore to locate and purchase the designated product. The battery display was comprised of 
five brands of AA batteries that varied in price and quality levels. Pretesting established the 
prices of the five brands to reflect differences in their perceived quality: Duracell/Energizer were 
rated the best (1; Maverage = 5.92) and were priced at $4.29, Rayovac/Panasonic were rated 
average (2; Maverage = 4.39) and were priced at $3.99, and Chateau was rated the worst (3; Maverage 
= 2.85) and was priced at $3.69. Paired samples t-tests reveal that differences between group 
means are significant (p’s < .01). In the friend condition, when participants entered the store 
aisle, the confederate they had met previously was standing next to the battery display. In the 
alone condition, no one else was present in the store aisle. Participants selected and purchased 
their brand and then returned to the experimenter where they completed a short questionnaire. In 
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the survey amidst questions related to the cover-story, participants were asked to indicate the 
brand of batteries they had purchased. Participants’ responses to this question were compared to 
that recorded by an observer situated two aisles away from the battery display with a clear view 
of participants. In addition, participants indicated their gender, age, major, and completed an 
open-ended suspicion probe. Examination of the suspicion probe indicated that none of the 
participants were aware that the two studies were related or guessed the research’s hypotheses. 
While the confederate cannot be considered as a friend per se, previous research (e.g., 
Burger et al. 2001; Dolinski et al. 2001) shows that short conversations with strangers lead 
individuals to treat them as if they were friends.  For instance, by using a similar manipulation to 
ours, Burger et al. (2001) find that participants in a conversation (versus a control) condition 
complied with a request from the confederate at a higher rate, as if they had been asked by a 
friend. Similarly, Dolinski et al. (2001, p. 1405) point out: “...people involved in a dialogue [but 
not in a monologue] with a stranger automatically treat him or her as a friend and, consequently 
comply with his or her request.” Thus, our manipulation allows us not only to control for 
closeness of friendship and avoid potential problems arising from participant provided “friend” 
classifications but also to create an experimental setting in which we can observe participants’ 
spending decisions as if they were made in the presence of a friend.  
 
 
2.3.2     Results 
We conducted regression analysis with amount spent as the dependent variable and the 
independent variables of accompanying friend, participant’s gender and their interaction term. 
Contrast coding was used for both gender (1 if male, -1 if female) and friend (1 if with friend, -1 
if alone). The overall regression model is significant (F(3, 87) = 8.02, p < .01) and the model R2 
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is 22.5%. We find significant main effects for friend (β = 0.08, p < .01) and gender (β = 0.05, p < 
.05). Importantly, the analysis reveals a positive and significant friend x gender interaction (β = 
0.06, p < .01). Consistent with H1, males spend significantly more in the presence of a friend as 
compared to the alone condition (Mfriend = $4.25 vs. Malone = $3.96, p < .01), whereas the average 
spending for females did not differ as a function of the social presence (Mfriend = $4.02 vs. Malone 
= $3.98, p > .54; see the Appendix B for the percentage of brands selected in each condition). 
The interaction effect is visually depicted in Figure 2.2. Moreover, as shown in Table 2.1, the 
confederate’s gender does not impact our results as males increase their spending in both the 
male and female friend conditions (vs. alone condition), whereas no significant change is 
observed in the spending of females across conditions.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Moderating Effect of Gender on the Relationship between Presence of a Friend and 
Consumers’ Spending 
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Table 2.1: Sample Statistics and Average Actual Spending across Conditions  
 
 
 
Alone 
(1) 
 
w/ Friend 
(2) 
w/ Male 
Friend 
(2a) 
w/ Female 
Friend 
(2b) 
Dif: 
(2) – (1) 
Dif: 
(2a) – (1) 
 
Dif: 
(2b) – (1) 
Male $3.96 (n = 23) 
$4.25 
(n = 20) 
$4.26 
(n = 11) 
$4.22 
(n = 9) 
$0.29 
(p < .01) 
$0.30 
(p < .01) 
$0.26 
(p < .01) 
Female $3.98 (n = 24) 
$4.02 
(n = 20) 
$3.99 
(n = 13) 
$4.07 
(n = 7) 
$0.04 
(p > .54) 
$0.01 
(p > .88) 
$0.09 
(p > .37) 
 
 
Further, we re-estimated our model by including gender match (1 if the participant and 
the confederate’s genders match, -1 otherwise) and gender mismatch (1 if the participant and the 
confederate’s genders do not match, -1 otherwise) variables in lieu of the friend variable. Under 
this specification, both variables being -1 indicates that the participant is alone. Furthermore, we 
interact these variables with the gender of the participant. The results reveal positive and 
significant coefficients for gender match (β = 0.10, p < .01) and gender mismatch (β =0.07, p < 
.05). The difference between the two coefficients is not significant (F(1, 81) = 0.82, p > .36). In 
addition, the coefficients of the interaction terms are positive and significant (βgenderxmatch = 0.05, 
p < .10 and βgenderxmismatch = 0.06, p < .05). There is no significant difference between the two 
coefficients (F(1, 81) = 0.11, p > .73), indicating that the friend’s effect is not driven by gender 
match/mismatch. 
 
2.3.3     Discussion 
 
 
Study 1 demonstrates that agentic consumers (i.e., males) spend significantly more money when 
they shop with a friend than when they shop alone, whereas communal consumers (i.e., females) 
tend to control their spending in the presence of a friend. The finding that males spend more 
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while females are more modest in the presence of a friend is consistent with our impression 
management framework. Study 2 has two primary objectives. First, we directly measure 
individual differences in consumers’ agency-communion orientation instead of using gender as a 
proxy. Second, because research has found that consumers differ in their responsiveness to social 
and interpersonal cues of situationally appropriate behavior (Gangestad and Snyder 2000), we 
explore the moderating role of self-monitoring.   
 
 
 
2.4     STUDY 2 
 
 
2.4.1     Self-Monitoring as a Moderator 
 
 
Effective impression management efforts require that individuals accurately scan the social 
situation for cues to determine how to respond and adjust their behavior accordingly. The theory 
of self-monitoring (Lennox and Wolfe 1984; Snyder 1974, 1987) posits that people differ in 
terms of their ability and willingness to engage in expressive control and strategically manage 
their public appearances. More specifically, according to Gangestad and Snyder (2000), high 
(versus low) self-monitors are better at monitoring their behavior and regulating their self-
presentation in order to convey desired public appearances.  
However, previous research documents that self-monitoring has an asymmetric impact on 
the public behavior of agentic and communal individuals (e.g., Bozin and Yoder 2008; Flynn and 
Ames 2006). For instance, Flynn and Ames (2006) find that higher self-monitoring provides 
additional benefits to communal individuals (i.e., females), but not to agentic individuals (i.e., 
males), in the context of self-enhancement. In their first study, an analysis of peer evaluations of 
the participants who completed a semester-long group project documents that high and low self-
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monitoring males are rated as equally valuable and influential contributors to the group by their 
peers. On the other hand, female group members with high (as compared to low) self-monitoring 
are considered more valuable and influential contributors. Moreover, in their second study, 
results of a dyadic negotiation exercise reveal that males high in self-monitoring do not perform 
better than those who are low in self-monitoring, whereas the negotiation outcome increases with 
high self-monitoring in the case of females. The authors attribute these findings to the notion that 
males tend to naturally exhibit the valued traits of competence and self-confidence; hence 
monitoring the situation and realizing the demand for self-confidence does not boost their 
performance. Females, on the other hand, increase their portrayal of competence and self-
confidence when they are high self-monitors who realize that the situation demands this; hence, 
they perform better. The authors point out: “We do not predict (nor find evidence) that men and 
women exhibit different levels of self-monitoring. Instead, we propose that the impact of self-
monitoring may be different for men and women because they experience different gender 
stereotypes” (p. 279).  
In light of these findings and the results of our first study, we anticipate that regardless of 
the level of their self-monitoring, agency-oriented consumers will spend more when 
accompanied by a friend as compared to when they are alone. This is because higher self-
monitoring is not expected to provide additional benefits to them in the process of self-
enhancement. Specifically, in context of shopping for the self, increased spending is often 
associated with self-promotion (Griskevicius et al. 2007), which is a typical behavior exhibited 
by agentic individuals. Thus, agentic consumers will not obtain additional benefits from 
monitoring the situation and realizing that engaging in self-promotion through increased 
spending would be a stereotype consistent self-presentation style. However, this should not be 
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the case for communion-oriented consumers for whom the impact of high self-monitoring on 
public behavior should be stronger. In particular, communals with high (vs. low) self-monitoring 
have the ability and tendency to adopt the “protective” self-presentation strategy that the 
situation calls for and engage in stereotypic consistent behavior to convey a favorable 
impression. Hence, high self-monitors will exert even more control on their spending in the 
presence of a friend and exhibit heightened level of modesty (or “self-depreciation”), leading 
them to reduce their spending as compared to when they are alone.  
In contrast, communals with low self-monitoring are not expected to decrease their 
spending in the presence of a friend. These consumers have difficulty in creating favorable 
impressions in the eyes of others (Bozin and Yoder 2008; Flynn and Ames 2006) due to a lack of 
skills in reading cues regarding socially appropriate behavior which results in them failing to 
alter their behavior accordingly. Our predictions can be summarized as follows: 
 H2: Self-monitoring will moderate the impact of a friend’s presence on spending for 
communion-oriented consumers, but not for agency-oriented consumers. Specifically, 
(a) agentic consumers with both high and low self-monitoring will spend more when 
they shop with a friend than when they shop alone, and (b) communal consumers with 
high, but not low, self-monitoring will spend less when they shop with a friend than 
when they shop alone.  
 
 
2.4.2     Method 
 
 
One hundred thirty-six shoppers were intercepted randomly as they entered a large shopping 
mall located in Turkey. Respondents were compensated with two movie tickets (worth 
approximately $10) in exchange for their participation in the study. Only customers shopping 
alone or accompanied by a single friend were invited to participate in this study.7
                                                 
7 We did not invite shoppers accompanied by more than one friend to participate in the study as previous research 
(e.g., Argo et al. 2005; Latané 1981) shows that the strength of a social influence increases with the number of 
 Although 136 
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customers participated in our study, 7 respondents were excluded from the sample due to missing 
responses. We also excluded 3 extreme observations, leaving 126 respondents, of which 53% 
were female and 45% were accompanied by a friend. Table 2.2 summarizes the sample statistics.  
 
 
Table 2.2: Sample Statistics 
 
 
   
Gender Frequency Percent  
Male (alone) 33 26.19 
Female (alone)  35 27.77 
Male (w/ Friend) 28 22.22 
Female (w/ Friend) 30 25.00 
   
Payment Method Frequency Percent  
Cash 55 43.65 
Credit          57 45.24 
Cash & Credit 14 11.11 
 
 
 
Respondents were asked to complete two surveys. Following Erdem, Swait, and 
Valenzuela (2006), to ensure that the items included in the surveys were correctly translated and 
conveyed the same meaning in Turkish, the standard technique of back-translation (from English 
to Turkish and then back to English) was used.8
                                                                                                                                                             
sources, which might have confounded our results. Limiting number of accompanying friends to one provides a 
more conservative test of our theory. 
 The entry survey included questions such as 
“How often do you visit this shopping mall?” and “How much do you plan to spend in this 
shopping mall today?”, whereas the exit survey assessed the amount they spent, agency-
communion orientations, self-monitoring, payment method and demographics. Buying 
impulsiveness (Rook and Fisher 1995) was also measured as an additional control variable.  
8 The scales were translated by two Turkish doctoral students studying at a North American university and a 
translation agency operating in Turkey. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
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2.4.3     Measures 
 
 
Agency/Communion. Sixteen five-point (1 = low, 5 = high) bipolar adjective scales from the 
Extended Version of Personal Attributes Questionnaire (EPAQ; Spence, Helmreich, and Holahan 
1979) were used to measure agency and communion. The reliability and validity of these widely 
used scales have been well documented (e.g., Helgeson 1994). Examples of items that assess 
agency are “not at all independent—very independent” and “feels very inferior —feels very 
superior.” Examples of items that assess communion are “very cold in relations with others—
very warm in relation with others” and “not at all aware of others’ feelings—very aware of 
others’ feelings”. The responses were averaged to create their respective orientations (αagency = 
0.67 and αcommunion = 0.76). As agency and communion dimensions are both embodied by an 
individual and a high score on agency or communion does not necessarily suggest a low score on 
the other dimension, a measure was needed to capture the difference between the two 
dimensions. Thus, after calculating agency and communion scores for each respondent, we 
created a new measure to assess relative agency orientation, “ACDIF”, by subtracting each 
respondent’s communion score from his/her agency score.9
Self-monitoring. We measured self-monitoring using Lennox and Wolfe’s (1984) revised 
self-monitoring scale, which consists of 13 items rated on seven-point scales (1= strongly 
 The ACDIF measure allows us to 
assess not only the direction but also the relative magnitude of each respondent’s agency-
communion orientation.  
                                                 
9 Dindia (2006, p.11) rationalizes this measure: “Women and men differ in degree if both possess the same trait or 
display the same behavior but one possesses or displays more of it. Thus, if both women and men are agentic and 
communal, but women are more communal and men are more agentic, then with respect to agency and communion, 
they differ in degree, not kind.” Winterich et al. (2009, p.213) also point out: “individuals who are not distinctly 
categorized as either masculine or feminine may experience identity conflict.” In their study examining donation 
behavior, they find that the pattern of results for androgynous and undifferentiated participants is inconsistent with 
the pattern exhibited by either those with masculine gender identity or those with feminine gender identity. 
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disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The scale includes items such as “In social situations, I have the 
ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for” and “When I feel that the 
image I am portraying isn’t working, I can readily change it to something that does”. These items 
were combined and averaged together to create a self-monitoring index (α = .75).10
 
  
2.4.4     Results 
 
 
The regression model included a contrast-coded variable for being accompanied by a friend (1 if 
with friend, -1 if alone), while relative agency-communion (“ACDIF”) and self-monitoring were 
included in the model as continuous variables. The model also includes two-way interactions and 
three-way interaction of these variables. To reduce multicollinearity, the continuous variables 
were mean-centered (Aiken and West 1991). Similar to the analysis in the pilot study, several 
control variables such as income and buying impulsiveness are also included in the model 
(please refer to the Appendix C for details of the model specification and the measures).  
 The OLS regression results indicate that the overall model is significant (F(16, 109) = 
12.89, p < .01) and the model R2 is 66.9% (see Table 2.3). In addition, all VIFs are less than 1.7, 
suggesting that our results do not suffer from multicollinearity. The main effect for friend is both 
positive and significant (δ2 = 0.14, p < .05). Further, consistent with H1, the interaction between 
friend and ACDIF is positive and significant (δ14 = 0.28, p < .05)11
                                                 
10 Consistent with Flynn and Ames (2006), we do not find a significant correlation between agency/communion 
orientation (i.e., ACDIF) and self-monitoring (ρ = - 0.15, p > .10).  
, indicating that the level of 
the difference between agency and communion orientation of an individual affects the degree to 
which s/he is influenced by the presence of a friend during a shopping trip. More important, as 
predicted by H2, there is a significant three-way interaction between friend, ACDIF, and self-
11 Consistent with our results in previous studies, when we use gender as a proxy for agency-communion, there is 
again a positive and significant interaction between friend and gender (β = 0.14, p < .05), as well as a significant 
main effect for friend (β = 0.12, p < .05).  
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monitoring (δ17 = 0.31, p < .05).12
 
 In addition, the coefficients of all the main control variables 
have the expected signs, but only planned amount (δ1 = 0.71, p < .01) and paying with a credit 
card (δ5 = 0.14, p < .05) are statistically significant. We also conducted several re-estimations of 
the model (e.g., correcting for potential sample selection bias) to provide more insight into our 
findings. The results are substantively unchanged. These analyses are presented in the Appendix 
C. 
 
Table 2.3: Regression Results 
 
 
  Equation: ln(amount spent) 
  Parameter Estimate t-value 
Intercept       3.99** 34.46 
ln(planned amount)       0.71**   9.90 
Friend     0.14*   2.16 
Time spent in the store     0.003   1.61 
ln(income)   0.02   0.24 
Credit     0.14*    2.00 
Mixed Payment (Cash + Credit)   0.15   1.21 
In-store special   0.12   1.82 
Buying Impulsiveness   0.01   0.23 
Visit  -0.04 -0.99 
Self-monitoring (SM)  -0.13 -1.40 
ACDIF   0.08   0.76 
Age    0.001   0.17 
Gender  -0.03 -0.50 
Friend x ACDIF     0.28*   2.60 
Friend x SM  -0.10 -1.19 
SM x ACDIF   0.10   0.70 
Friend x ACDIF x SM     0.31*   2.12 
*p < .05  **p < .01                        R2 =67.0%  
 
                                                 
12 We also estimated a modified version of our model where the dependent variable was the difference between 
actual and planned spending and ln(planned) was dropped from the right hand side of the model. The coefficients on 
the friend x ACDIF and friend x ACDIF x self-monitoring are still positive and significant at the 5% level, whereas 
the coefficient on friend is positive, but not significant.   
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To facilitate the interpretation of the three-way interaction, we follow the post-hoc 
probing procedure recommended by Aiken and West (1991). We first calculate high (low) values 
for ACDIF and self-monitoring by adding (subtracting) the standard deviation to (from) the 
mean. We then conduct simple slope analysis, which examines the interaction between ACDIF 
and presence of a friend during a shopping trip on amount spent at low and high levels of self-
monitoring. This analysis enables us to assess whether the pattern of results is consistent with the 
specific predictions of the second hypothesis. The moderating effect of self-monitoring is 
visually depicted in Figure 2.3. We also report the average actual spending across conditions in 
Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4: Average Actual Spending across Conditions 
 
 
 Alone w/ Friend 
 Low SM High SM Low SM High SM 
High ACDIF 58.29 
(n=19) 
68.31 
(n=16) 
90.72 
(n=17) 
177.61 
(n=12) 
Low ACDIF 75.48 
(n=16) 
87.46 
(n=17) 
82.07 
(n=11) 
64.61 
(n=18) 
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Figure 2.3: Three-Way Interaction between Presence of a Friend, ACDIF (Agency-Communion) 
Score and Self-Monitoring 
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Low Monitor 
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As predicted by H2a, we find that the slopes for high self-monitor/high-ACDIF (b = 
0.378, t = 2.90, p < .01) and low self-monitor/high-ACDIF (b = 0.243, t = 2.15, p < .05) are both 
significantly different from zero, indicating that regardless of their level of self-monitoring, 
consumers with high ACDIF scores spend significantly more when they are with a friend than 
when they are alone. Although the slope for high self-monitors is greater than that of low self-
monitors, the difference between the slopes is not significant (t = 0.82, p > .41).  
Furthermore, the slope for high self-monitor/low-ACDIF is negative and significant (b = 
-0.254, t = 1.84, p < .05, one tailed), implying that high self-monitors with low ACDIF spend 
less when they shop with a friend as compared to when they shop alone. Although the slope for 
low self-monitor/low-ACDIF is positive, it is not statistically significant (b = 0.203, t = 1.33, p > 
.18). Finally, the difference between the two slopes is statistically significant (t = 2.06, p < .05). 
These results support H2b.  
 
2.4.5     Discussion 
 
 
The results support our thesis that self-monitoring qualifies the impact of the presence of a friend 
on spending for communion-oriented consumers, but not for agency-oriented consumers. We 
find that agentics consistently spend more when they are accompanied by a friend as compared 
to when they are alone regardless of self-monitoring. However, higher self-monitoring moderates 
the impact of a friend’s presence on the spending of the communion-oriented consumers. 
Communals with high self-monitoring spend less in the presence of a friend, whereas there is no 
difference in the amount spent by communals with low self-monitoring when they shop alone as 
compared to with a friend.  
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 Thus far in our analysis, we either use gender as a proxy for the agentic or communal 
nature of participants (pilot study and Study 1) or measure agency-communion orientation 
(Study 2). Although both methods have been employed in the literature (e.g., He et al. 2008; 
Helgeson 1994; Winterich et al. 2009), priming agency-communion orientation will enable us to 
test our hypotheses in a more controlled setting. This is one of the objectives of Study 3.  
 Furthermore, a basic premise of our research is that communion-oriented consumers’ 
impression management concerns lead them to control their spending in the presence of their 
friends. While the spending context utilized in the first three studies is self-focused (i.e., counter 
to a communion-oriented perspective) there are certain instances where increased spending is 
consistent with communal stereotypes. One such instance might involve donations to a charity, 
because the communal stereotypic beliefs mainly describe a concern with the welfare of other 
people and communion-oriented individuals embody such traits as caring, being helpful, and 
sympathetic (i.e., characteristics inherent in a charity; Eagly 1987). Conversely, agency-oriented 
individuals place emphasis on independence from others and embody such traits as being self-
reliant (i.e., characteristics not inherent in donating to a charity). Thus, if differences in 
impression management concerns of agency- and communion-oriented consumers are the 
underlying reason for their differential sensitivity to a friend’s influence, our findings should 
reverse when we examine communion- and agency-primed individuals’ donation behavior in the 
presence of their friends.  Specifically, agency-primed consumers with both high and low self-
monitoring should adapt a “protective” self-presentation strategy (instead of “acquisitive” style 
as they do in the spending context); thus they should neither increase nor decrease their donation 
in the presence of their friends. It is important to note that although decreased donation is 
consistent with the self-reliant nature of agentic consumers, it will increase the risk of being seen 
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as “greedy” and “cheap”, which is inconsistent with agentics’ aspiration for status among their 
peers. As a result, we predict no effect (rather than a decline) of the presence of a friend on the 
amount donated by agentic consumers regardless of their self-monitoring. Communion-primed 
individuals with high self-monitoring are expected to donate more to a charity in the presence of 
a friend (vs. when they are alone), whereas communion-primed individuals with low self-
monitoring should not change their donation when they are accompanied by a friend (vs. alone).  
 
 
 
2.5     STUDY 3 
 
 
2.5.1     Method 
 
 
A 2 (orientation: agency vs. communion) x 2 (social presence: alone vs. friend) x 2 (self-
monitoring: high vs. low) between-subjects experimental design was employed. Orientation and 
social presence were manipulated, whereas self-monitoring was measured. One hundred ninety-
two undergraduate students from a large North American University completed the study in 
exchange for course credit.  
 Procedure. Undergraduate students signed up for the study with a friend who was also a 
registered undergraduate student at the same university. Upon arrival, the pairs of friends were 
informed that three randomly selected participants would receive $50 after the study. They were 
then randomly assigned to agency/communion and friend/alone conditions. Participants in the 
alone condition were told that they would complete the study in separate rooms, whereas 
participants who were assigned to the friend condition remained in the same room until the end 
of the study. The experimenters (two males and two females) were also randomly assigned to the 
different conditions.  
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 The first part of the survey included a priming task and manipulation check exercise. The 
experimenter then presented participants with a list of eight (fictitious) charities and verbally 
asked each participant whether s/he would like to donate to a charity if s/he won the $50, and if 
so how much. In the friend condition, while the experimenter asked the donation question to both 
participants simultaneously, only the first participant’s answer was included in the analysis as the 
other participant’s response might be influenced by the first participant’s response. Finally, 
participants in both the friend and alone conditions were given the second part of the survey, 
which contained the self-monitoring scale13
  
, demographic questions, and an open-ended 
suspicion probe.  None of the participants guessed the focal hypotheses of the research. 
2.5.2     Measures  
 
 
Agency-Communion Prime. To manipulate agency-communion orientation we used a scrambled-
sentence task. Participants were presented with 20 scrambled sentences of which 15 were related 
to agency or communion orientation depending on the prime. The remaining five sentences were 
not related to either prime and were categorized as neutral (see the Appendix D for the full list of 
sentences). Words and phrases used for each prime were taken from Eagly (1987), Myers-Levy 
(1988), and Winterich et al. (2009). For example, the agency prime included sentences such as 
“personal beliefs are important” and “I try to be assertive”, while the communion prime included 
sentences such as “social norms are important” and “I try to be selfless”.  
 Self-monitoring. We again measured self-monitoring (α = 0.74; Lennox and Wolfe 1984). 
 Manipulation Check. To verify that the agency-communion prime was successful, we 
used Kuhn and McPartland’s (1954) task where participants completed ten “I am ...” statements. 
                                                 
13 Neither the agency-communion prime nor the presence of a friend has a significant impact on the self-monitoring 
scores (ρAC-SM = 0.14, p > .10; ρF-SM = -0.06, p > .50) 
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Two independent research assistants coded each response as either agentic or communal (95% 
agreement with any disagreements resolved through discussion). Agentic statements referred to a 
personal description, attitude or belief focusing on self (e.g., I am independent, I am tall). 
Communal statements referred to either relationships or sensitivity to others (e.g., I am helpful, I 
am a daughter) or a demographic group or category to which the participant belongs to (e.g., I 
am a marketing major, I am a Christian). Statements that did not relate to either category were 
classified as other (e.g., I am hungry) and were excluded from the analysis. Participants in the 
agency-priming condition wrote more agentic statements than those in the communion-priming 
condition (Magency = 5.30 vs. Mcommunion = 4.62, t = 2.38, p < .05). Participants in the communion-
priming condition wrote more communal statements relative to those in the agency-priming 
condition (Magency = 3.42 vs. Mcommunion = 4.55, t = 4.00, p < .01). These results indicate that 
agency-communion orientation was successfully primed.14
 
 
2.5.3     Results 
 
 
Excluding accompanying friends and two outliers from the analysis resulted in a final sample 
size of 124 respondents (45% female; 52% with friend). The average donation was $23.14 (SD = 
$17.44). Table 2.5 reports the average donation across conditions.  
 
Table 2.5: Average Actual Donation across Conditions 
 
 
 Alone w/ Friend 
 Low SM High SM Low SM High SM 
Agency 
Priming 
$25.28 
(n=18) 
$29.17 
(n=12) 
$22.67 
(n=15) 
$23.42 
(n=19) 
Communion 
Priming 
$28.13 
(n=16) 
$17.50 
(n=14) 
$12.69 
(n=13) 
$24.71 
(n=17) 
                                                 
14 Given that agency-communion orientation may be difficult to manipulate due to internalization of these 
characteristics through socialization at an early age (Eagly 1987, Winterich et al. 2009), an experimental design in 
which agency-communion orientation is primed provides a conservative test of our hypothesis. 
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We use regression to test our hypothesis, with self-monitoring mean-centered to 
minimize multicollinearity (all VIFs < 1.5). Contrast coding was used for agency-communion 
prime (1 if agency, -1 if communion), friend (1 if with friend, -1 if alone), and gender (1 if male, 
-1 if female). We regressed donation amount on the agency-communion prime, friend, self-
monitoring, two-way interactions, three-way interaction of these variables, and gender. The 
results indicate that the overall model is significant (F(8, 115) = 2.17, p < .05) and the model R2 
is 13.14% (see Table 2.6). As predicted, there was a significant three-way interaction among 
agency-communion prime, friend, and self-monitoring (β = -6.67, p < .05). The friend x self-
monitoring interaction was also significant (β = 7.00, p < .01). No other effects were significant. 
To facilitate the interpretation of the three-way interaction, we follow the post-hoc probing 
procedure recommended by Aiken and West (1991; see Figure 2.4).  
 
 
Table 2.6: Regression Results 
 
 
  Equation: Amount Donated 
  Parameter Estimate t-value 
Intercept     23.06** 14.86 
Friend  -2.49 -1.60 
Agency-Communion (AC)   2.38  1.54 
Self-monitoring (SM)   3.54  1.33 
Gender  -1.23 -0.80 
Friend x AC    0.97  0.63 
Friend x SM  -0.10 -1.19 
SM x AC       7.00**  2.64 
Friend x AC x SM    -6.67* -2.51 
*p < .05  **p < .01                        R2 =13.1%  
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Figure 2.4: Three-Way Interaction between Presence of a Friend, Agency-Communion 
Orientation and Self-Monitoring 
 
 
 
High Monitor 
 
Low Monitor 
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Consistent with our hypothesis, for both high and low self-monitors in the agency-
priming condition there is no significant relation between presence of a friend and donation 
amount (bA-HSM =  -1.32, t = -0.42, p > .60); bA-LSM = -1.73 , t = -0.59, p > .55). Conversely, for 
those with communion-prime and high-self monitoring, the presence of a friend has positive and 
significant impact on donation amount (bC-HSM = 4.93, t = 1.65, p = .05, one-tailed test); the 
presence of a friend (vs. alone) leads to higher donations by communion-primed participants 
with high self-monitoring. This result is consistent with the argument that since communal 
individuals tend to be caring and nurturing, displaying a portrait that is consistent with these 
characteristics in front of a friend may bring about social rewards. Conversely, communion-
primed participants with low self-monitoring donated less in the presence of a friend as 
compared to the alone condition (bC-LSM = -11.85, t = -3.29, p < .01). This result is unexpected 
and we speculate on why it arose in the discussion section. However, overall our results provide 
support for the predicted reversal of the friend effect in the donation (vs. spending) context.    
 
2.5.4     Discussion 
 
   
Study 3 demonstrates that the presence of a friend and self-monitoring interact to influence 
donation behavior of communion-oriented individuals, but not agency-oriented individuals. 
Stated differently, the direction of the interaction among presence of a friend, agency-
communion orientation, and self-monitoring documented in Study 2 reversed when the consumer 
decision under examination changed from “spending for the self” to “donation to a charity”. 
Jointly, Studies 2 and 3 provide a test of the underlying role of impression management 
concerns. We document that individuals, with the exception of communals with low self-
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monitoring, shape their spending decisions in the presence of their peers to avoid counteracting 
the stereotypes associated with their orientation.   
 One puzzling finding obtained in this study is that communals with low self-monitoring 
decrease their donation to a charity in the presence of a friend (vs. alone). A possible explanation 
for this finding is that low self-monitors may simultaneously exert less effort and try to avoid 
being seen as making an effort to create a good impression, which may sometimes lead them to 
exhibit context inappropriate behavior (i.e., donating less to a charity in the presence of a friend 
since they were primed to think that others value nurturance). This is consistent with the items 
appearing in  Snyder’s (1987) self-monitoring scale that describes low self-monitors (e.g., “At 
parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like” and “I feel 
a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I should”). Noteworthy is that 
previous research has also documented unexpected findings regarding the public behavior of low 
self-monitors (e.g., Ratner and Kahn 2002; White and Gerstein 1987). Future research is needed 
to reconcile theoretical arguments and empirical findings on the behavior of low self-monitors in 
different types of public contexts. 
 
 
 
2.6     GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Across three field studies and a lab experiment, we demonstrate the expensive impact of a 
“friendly” social influence on consumers’ actual spending decisions. In general, our findings 
suggest that the effect has the greatest implications for agentic consumers (e.g., males) as a 
decision to shop with a friend (versus alone) tends to have negative ramifications for their 
pocketbook – they spend more with an accompanying friend. This caveat does not appear to hold 
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for communal consumers (e.g., females). In fact, communal consumers with high self-monitoring 
spend significantly less money when they shop with a friend than when they shop alone. These 
findings appear to be spending context dependent as we also document that when the spending is 
for a good cause (i.e., donating to a charity), communals with high self-monitoring loosen their 
purse strings in the presence of a friend (versus alone), while donation behavior of agentics is not 
influenced by an accompanying friend.  
Our investigation of the impact of an accompanying friend on consumer spending makes 
important contributions with implications for both consumers and managers. First, previous 
research on social influences has found that friends influence consumers’ purchase decisions in a 
positive way by providing information related to the product (Urbany et al. 1989). We extend 
this research by demonstrating that friends can also have deleterious implications for a shopper’s 
wallet, as agentic shoppers spend more when they are accompanied by a friend as opposed to 
when they shop alone. Furthermore, the variability in our empirical design allows us to control 
for any confounding social factors including “mere presence effect” (Argo et al. 2005). For 
instance, our second study was conducted in a large shopping mall where both solo shoppers and 
those accompanied by a friend were subject to the mere presence effect of other shoppers in the 
stores, but we document a significant friend effect which is beyond any mere presence effect.   
Our research also explores the underlying mechanism that drives our effects. We theorize 
that the presence of a friend impacts consumer spending because it motivates consumers to 
engage in impression management. To empirically explore this possibility, we identify and test 
the moderating roles of a consumer’s agency-communion orientation and individual differences 
in self-monitoring, and test the impact of the spending context. First, we argue that support for an 
impression management mechanism would be provided if consumers engage in stereotypic 
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consistent behaviors in the presence of their friends. According to the stereotype literature (e.g., 
Rosenthal and Rubin 1978) individuals are motivated to engage in behaviors that are consistent 
with existing stereotypes when they are in public settings. A stereotype of agency-oriented 
individuals is that they are self-oriented and thus, in the present context, a consistent behavior 
could be self-promotion manifesting through increased spending. Conversely, because a 
stereotype of communion-oriented individuals is that they are group-focused, a behavior that 
would be consistent with this stereotype in the current research would be one that would prevent 
the person from standing out (i.e., they would be modest and would limit their spending). We 
find support for such effects.  
Second, the definition of self-monitoring revolves around the idea that those who are high 
in this individual difference are likely to adapt and change their behaviors (i.e., manage their 
impressions) when in the presence of others. However, previous research (e.g., Flynn and Ames 
2006) also suggests that higher self-monitoring provides additional benefits to communal 
individuals, but not to agentic individuals, in the process of impression management. Thus, 
Study 2’s demonstration that our effects arise asymmetrically for communal and agentic 
consumers lends additional credence to the proposed underlying mechanism. The impact of an 
accompanying friend on the spending of agentic and communal consumers who are high in self-
monitoring is positive and negative, respectively, whereas it is positive for both groups who are 
low in self-monitoring (though the impact is not significant for communal consumers with low 
self-monitoring). Finally, we provide evidence for the underlying role of impression 
management concerns by finding that the pattern of results is dependent on the spending context. 
In particular, agentics/communals with high self-monitoring spend more in the presence of a 
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friend (versus alone) in contexts when impression management concerns are paramount (agentic 
= self-focused situations, communal = other-focused situations).  
In addition to extending the current literature on social influence in the market place, our 
research contributes to the nascent literature examining how agency-communion orientation 
impacts consumers’ monetary decisions. While previous studies demonstrate the role of agency 
and communion on consumers’ financial risk taking (He et al. 2008) and donation behavior 
(Winterich et al. 2009) in a private decision-making context, our study focuses on impression 
management related spending implications of the orientations.        
Our findings have important implications for managers. Given that agentic consumers’ 
spending appears to be highly susceptible to the presence of a friend, managers should focus on 
strategies that will help them attract a higher number of male consumers who shop with their 
friends. By creating shopping environments that prime an agentic orientation and encourage 
shopping with friends, retailers may be able to boost sales. For example, offering promotions 
such as “bring a friend and both get an extra X% off” targeted to male consumers can be 
effective in that increased spending by both consumers can cover expenses of the promotion and 
generate additional revenue. In fact, such a promotion might also legitimize spending for females 
since both shoppers will be receiving a discount. 
 Future research is needed to explore whether there are conditions (other than donating to 
a charity) under which communion-oriented individuals will purchase more when in the presence 
of a friend. It seems likely that there are instances in which communion-oriented consumers may 
not want to convey an impression of being modest such as when they are purchasing a gift for 
someone else. In this instance, modesty concerns may go by the wayside in favor of creating 
other types of impressions (e.g., a generous friend). Research should also examine the conditions 
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under which the type of store inhibits communion-oriented consumers from imposing mental 
constraints on their behavior (i.e., behaving modestly) or spurs them to spend more when in the 
presence of a friend. For instance it is possible that in environments that are more experiential in 
nature (e.g. salon or spa), the physical relaxation from receiving the treatment might 
simultaneously relax tendencies to engage in the stereotypic-consistent behavior of modesty and 
as a result communion-oriented individuals may be more likely to spend more when a friend is 
present (e.g., try additional services).  
 Few purchase decision are made in a social void. Thus, it is important to examine how 
others influence our purchase decisions and spending. In this research, we took a crucial step 
toward achieving this goal by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the impact of shopping 
with friends, a major source of social influence in the shopping context, on consumers’ spending. 
However, more research is needed to better understand the nature of the relationship between a 
friend’s presence and a consumer’s spending.  
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3.0      ESSAY 2: SOCIAL POWER AND FINANCIAL RISK TAKING: THE ROLE OF 
AGENCY-COMMUNION 
 
 
 
Often described as individuals’ ability to control resources of their own and others without social 
interference, power has been shown to impact different aspects of human behavior. Recently 
researchers have begun to explore the effects of power on individuals’ consumption and 
spending patterns. This stream of literature documents that experiencing a state of powerlessness 
versus powerfulness leads consumers to spend more money on status related items (Rucker and 
Galinsky 2008), as well as on the items they purchase for others versus themselves (Rucker, 
Dubois, and Galinsky 2011). In the present research, I investigate an alternative channel through 
which social power can influence consumers’ welfare, namely financial risk taking.  
 Consumers often face risky monetary decisions such as investing in a stock versus bond 
fund, buying a lottery ticket or making a bet in a gamble. These decisions, in turn, have 
important implications for their welfare and well-being. However, little is known how 
individuals’ interactions with others influence their financial risk taking. In a recent study, Levav 
and Argo (2010) document that an interpersonal touch can influence individuals’ propensity to 
make risky financial decisions through altering their sense of security. In this study, I focus on 
the link between financial risk taking and a more prevalent social force that generally has 
negative connotations, i.e., social power.  
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 I propose that having power versus lacking power over others does not unconditionally 
affect people’s risk seeking in their financial choices. Rather its impact depends on individuals’ 
agency-communion orientation (i.e., the tendency to focus on the self or others; Bakan 1966). 
Consistent with my thesis, I find that having power versus lacking it increases financial risk 
taking by agentic, but not communal, individuals. I attribute this to the notion that self-oriented 
individuals link power with self-interest goals, whereas other-oriented individuals associate 
power with responsibility goals (Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh 2001). In other words, agentic 
individuals experiencing a state of power take greater financial risk since increased wealth can 
fortify their powerful position and help them maintain their status. On the other hand, taking risk 
to enhance wealth and maintain the status associated with power is inconsistent with communal 
goals. I provide evidence supporting the proposed underlying mechanism by documenting that 
the effect of social power on agentic individuals’ financial risk taking is reversed such that they 
take less risk when the risky decision offers low versus high personal benefit. However, 
communal individuals experiencing a sense of power refrain from taking higher financial risk 
regardless of the level of potential self-benefit associated with a risky decision. Further, I find 
that pursuit of self-interest goals mediates the interactive influence of power and agency-
communion orientation on individuals’ tendency to take financial risk.   
 This study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, the present 
research adds to the growing body of work examining the role of social power in consumer 
behavior. To date, related studies have explored this role by looking at the changes in 
consumers’ product preference and spending patterns (e.g., Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009; 
Fisher, Gregorie, and Murray 2011). I extend this stream of research by investigating how social 
power alters consumers’ risk preferences in the financial domain. Second, the findings of this 
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research further our understanding of how consumers’ interactions with those around them 
influence their financial risk taking (e.g., Levav and Argo 2010; Zhu et al. 2012). Finally, this 
research adds to the recent literature on the link between consumers’ agency-communion 
orientation and their monetary decisions (e.g., He, Inman, and Mittal 2008; Kurt, Inman, and 
Argo 2011, Winterich, Mittal, and, Ross 2009). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Next, I present the conceptual framework along with my hypothesis. Then I report the results 
from three studies and conclude with a discussion of the results.   
 
 
 
3.1     CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Power, defined as “asymmetric control over valuable resources and outcomes within a situation 
and set of social relations” (Galinsky et al. 2008, p. 1451), has long been recognized by social 
scientists as an important determinant of human behavior. The possession of power has been 
shown to influence various psychological processes such as perspective taking (e.g., Tjosvold 
and Sagaria 1978), stereotyping (e.g., Fiske 1993), and group decision making (e.g., Fodor and 
Smith 1982). Other studies have also documented that having power versus lacking power over 
others increases individuals’ propensity to act (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee 2003) and 
facilitates goal pursuit (Guinote 2007). The documented effects of power are prevalent as 
individuals are often assigned to powerful and powerless roles in their everyday lives. That is, 
managers have power over their employees, teachers have power over their students, and team 
leaders have power over other team members, etc.    
 Recently, researchers have started to examine whether experiencing a state of 
powerfulness or powerlessness impacts individuals’ consumption and spending patterns (for a 
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detailed review see Rucker, Galinsky, and Dubois 2012). For instance, Rucker and Galinsky 
(2008) find that consumers who are in a state of low versus high power are willing to spend more 
on status-related products (e.g., an executive pen, a silk tie) which can help them restore their 
sense of power. In a related study, Rucker and Galinsky (2009) investigate how social power 
affects consumers’ relative preference between products that are perceived as offering utility 
(e.g., performance and quality) and those that are viewed as signaling status to others. They 
document that high power consumers hold more favorable attitudes toward high-quality product 
of low-status than low-quality product of high-status, whereas the opposite is true for low power 
consumers. Further, Rucker et al. (2011) find that consumers experiencing a state of high power 
spend more money on the items they purchase for themselves than on the items they purchase for 
others, while the opposite effect is observed among those experiencing a state of low power. 
They attribute this to the notion that for the powerful, self is associated with greater 
psychological utility as compared to others, resulting in higher monetary worth allocated to 
spending on the self versus others. 
 In the present research, I focus on the impact of social power on a different aspect of 
consumer decision making, i.e., financial risk taking. This is an important issue to address since 
consumers’ risky decisions in the financial domain can significantly alter their wealth and 
thereby have a major impact on their current and future spending ability. To date, however, 
limited research has examined the link between social power and individuals’ risk perceptions 
and only in non-financial contexts such as health. Anderson and Galinsky (2006) find that high 
power, relative to low power, individuals perceive the world as less dangerous and filled with 
lower risk. Accordingly, for instance, high power individuals are more likely than low power 
individuals to engage in unprotected sex. In a recent study, Kim and McGill (2011) document 
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that higher power leads to lower risk perceptions only when individuals are facing risk-bearing 
mechanisms that are anthropomorphized (e.g., when skin cancer is described as if it has 
humanlike intentions to hurt people). The authors argue that this effect occurs because 
individuals who feel powerful tend to believe that they can transfer this feeling of mastery to the 
anthropomorphized entity, helping them control it. Overall, these studies suggest that social 
power affects individuals’ risk perceptions by altering their optimism and sense of control over 
risk-bearing mechanisms.  
 While conceptualizing the relation between social power and financial risk taking, it is 
important to note that in addition to affecting individuals’ overall well-being, the outcomes of 
risky financial decisions directly impact individuals’ wealth. Thus, I maintain that the effect of 
having power over others on consumers’ risk taking in the financial domain is not simple but 
contingent on whether or not people associate social power with self-interest goals aimed at 
enhancing their own wealth and maintaining the status associated with power. 
  As a basis for my theoretical framework, I use the agency-communion theory (Bakan 
1966), which postulates that all humans possess two fundamental modalities, i.e., agency and 
communion. Previous research has explored the usefulness of agency-communion in different 
aspects of human behavior such as psychological and physical well-being (e.g., Helgeson 1994, 
Helgeson and Palladino 2012), information processing (Woike, Lavezzary, and Barsky 2001), 
and social comparison (e.g., Locke and Nekich 2000). In their most simplistic forms, agency 
refers to a tendency to reflect on one’s individuality and emphasizes the self and its separation 
from other organisms, while communion refers to the merging of an individual in a larger 
organism and social connections with others (Helgeson 1994). That is, agency involves self-
assertion and self-expansion, putting the pleasures and activities of the self at the center stage. In 
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contrast, communion involves such qualities as selflessness and emotional expressivity (Eagly 
1987). Thus, agentic individuals strive for status and authority that facilitate and protect the 
differentiation of the individual from others. And, their behavior is primarily oriented toward 
achieving independence and mastery experiences. On the other hand, communal individuals 
strive for cooperation and harmony that protect the unity of the individual with a social entity 
(Wiggins 1991).  
 Consistent with the agency-communion theory, prior studies document that power 
motivation is positively correlated with agentic traits, while it is negatively related to communal 
qualities (e.g., Brunstein, Schultheiss, and Grassman 1998; McAdams et al. 1996; Saragovi et al. 
2002). In parallel, low versus high status individuals are perceived to be less agentic and more 
communal (Conway et al. 1996). Researchers have also found that greater agency is ascribed to 
those who are wealthy versus poor (Christopher and Schlenken 2000) and those with higher 
versus lower earning potential (Sprecher 1989). Furthermore, Johannesen-Schmidt and Eagly 
(2002) document that higher income conveys agentic qualities (e.g., competence) and a lower 
level of communion (e.g., warmth).  
 More recently, within their promoting interests scheme, Frimer et al. (2011, p. 150) 
conceptualize agency as “the motive to promote the interests of the self, which manifests as the 
themes of social power, dominance, material wealth, and achievement”, while communion 
pertains to the “motive to promote the interests of others [rather than the self].” This is consistent 
with Chen et al.’s (2001) relationship-orientation based conceptualization of power’s effects, 
which proposes that self-focused individuals associate social power with self-interest goals, 
whereas other-focused individuals link power with responsibility goals. Based on prior literature, 
I contend that agency-communion orientation moderates the effect of social power on 
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individuals’ financial risk taking behavior such that feeling powerful versus powerless leads to 
greater financial risk taking only for those individuals who are agency-oriented. Specifically, 
while agentic individuals with high (versus low) power are predicted to make riskier financial 
decisions to enhance their own wealth and highlight their status, communal individuals with high 
(versus low) power are expected to act responsibly and refrain from taking higher financial risk. 
Formally:  
H1: Having power versus lacking power leads to greater financial risk taking for agency-
oriented, but not communion-oriented, individuals.       
 
 
 
 
3.2     STUDY 1 
 
 
3.2.1     Method   
 
 
Study 1 employs a 2 (social power: high vs. low) x 2 (orientation: agency vs. communion) 
between-subjects experimental design. Power was manipulated, whereas agency-communion 
orientation was measured. One hundred undergraduate students (45 female, 55 male) registered 
for an introductory marketing course at a large mid-Atlantic university completed the study in 
exchange for course credit.  
 Participants first filled out the agency-communion scale and then completed the social 
power manipulation followed by a task designed to measure their financial risk taking tendency. 
Power was manipulated using an episodic prime adapted from Galinsky et al. (2003). In the 
high-power condition, participants read:  
“Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or 
individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another 
person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those 
individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power―what happened, how 
you felt, etc.”  
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In the low-power condition, participants read:  
“Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By power, 
we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something you 
wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this situation in which you 
did not have power―what happened, how you felt, etc.”  
 
3.2.2     Measures  
 
 
Agency-Communion orientation. Sixteen seven-point (1 = low, 7 = high) bipolar adjective scales 
from the Extended Version of Personal Attributes Questionnaire (EPAQ; Spence, Helmreich, 
and Holahan 1979) were used to measure agency and communion. The reliability and validity of 
these widely used scales have been well documented (e.g., Helgeson 1994). Examples of items 
that assess agency are “not at all independent—very independent” and “not at all self-
confident—very self-confident.” Examples of items that assess communion are “very cold in 
relations with others—very warm in relation with others” and “not at all aware of others’ 
feelings—very aware of others’ feelings”. The responses were averaged to create their respective 
orientations (αagency = .75 and αcommunion = .85). 
  As agency and communion dimensions are both embodied by an individual and a high 
score on agency or communion does not necessarily suggest a low score on the other dimension, 
a measure was needed to capture the difference between the two dimensions. Thus, following 
previous research (e.g., Kurt et al. 2011), after calculating agency and communion scores for 
each respondent, I created a new measure to assess relative agency orientation, “ACDIF”, by 
subtracting each respondent’s communion score from his/her agency score. The ACDIF measure 
allows for assessing not only the direction but also the relative magnitude of each respondent’s 
agency-communion orientation. Consistent with Kurt et al. (2011), I classify participants with 
high ACDIF scores as agentic and those with low ACDIF score as communal.  
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Financial risk taking. Participants’ financial risk taking was measured using a task 
adapted from Kermer et al. (2006). Participants were asked to imagine that they were given $100 
and told that they could participate in a 50-50 gamble in which they could win an additional 
$100 or lose $10, $20, $30, $40, $50, $60, $70, $80, $90, or $100. Participants indicated whether 
they would accept each of these offers. Among the offers accepted by a participant, his/her 
highest potential loss (i.e., highest amount s/he is willing to risk to earn additional $100) is used 
as the dependent variable in the analysis.   
 
3.2.3     Results and Discussion 
 
 
Six participants who failed to complete the power manipulation task were excluded from the 
analysis, leaving 94 usable responses for the analysis.15
 Consistent with my prediction, there is a positive and significant interaction between 
power and ACDIF (β = 3.56, p < .05). Further, the results also reveal a positive and marginally 
significant main effect for ACDIF (β = 3.24, p = .08). No other effects are significant. To 
facilitate the interpretation of the two-way interaction, I follow the post-hoc probing procedure 
 The mean (median) amount wagered by 
participants is $42.90 ($40.00). The results were analyzed using OLS where the dependent 
variable is the financial risk taking measure and independent variables are power condition 
(contrast coded: 1 for high-power, -1 for low-power), ACDIF, and their interaction. The 
regression model also includes gender as a covariate. The model R-square is 10.7%. As 
suggested by Aiken and West (1991), ACDIF score is mean-centered to reduce multicollinearity 
(VIFs < 1.17) and facilitate the interpretation of main effects.  
                                                 
15 Four excluded participants that were assigned to the high-power condition provided the following responses: “I 
cannot think of a time”, “I can’t recall such an experience”, “I can’t think of an instance at the moment”, and “I 
really don’t think this ever happened before”.  Similarly, one of the excluded participants that were in the low-power 
condition indicated: “I honestly cannot recall a single instance”. The other participant did not answer the question.  
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recommended by Aiken and West (1991). I first calculate high (low) values for ACDIF by 
adding (subtracting) the standard deviation to (from) the mean. I then conduct simple slope 
analysis, which examines the effect of social power at high and low levels of ACDIF. The 
moderating effect of ACDIF is visually depicted in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The Moderating Role of Agency-Communion on the Relation between Social Power 
and Financial Risk Taking 
 
 
 
Supporting H1, I find that the slope for high ACDIF (i.e., agentic) participants is positive 
and significant (b = 5.031, t = 1.71, p < .05, one-tailed test), indicating that the experience of 
power increases agentic individuals’ tendency to take financial risk. On the other hand, the slope 
for low ACDIF (i.e., communal) participants is negative and insignificant (b = -3.575, t = -1.20, 
ns). This result suggests that having power versus lacking it does not result in greater financial 
risk taking among communal individuals.  
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 Study 1 provides the initial evidence that social power does not unconditionally affect 
consumers’ propensity to make risky financial decisions but its effect depends on individuals’ 
agency-communion orientation. That is, while agentic individuals take greater financial risk 
when they experience a sense of power over others (versus when others have power over them), 
this is not the case for communal individuals. Although this study documents the interactive 
influence of power and agency-communion orientation on financial risk seeking, it does not test 
the mechanism underlying the documented effect. The next study is designed to achieve this 
goal. I argue that agentic individuals with high (versus low) power make riskier financial choices 
since a potential increase in their own wealth will help them enhance their powerful position and 
maintain the status associated with power. Thus, when the level of potential self-benefit 
associated with a risky decision is low, agentic individuals with high power are not expected to 
seek greater financial risk. Further, given that having power versus lacking it induces a sense of 
responsibility among communal individuals, possession of power will not lead them to make 
riskier financial decisions regardless of the level of self-benefit expected from putting their 
money at risk.  
 
 
 
3.3     STUDY 2 
 
 
3.3.1     Method 
 
 
Study 2 employs a 2 (social power: high vs. low) x 2 (orientation: agency vs. communion) x 2 
(self-benefit: high vs. low) between-subjects experimental design. Power and self-benefit were 
manipulated, whereas agency-communion orientation was measured. Three hundred and forty 
five US participants (191 female, 154 male; Median age = 29.5) recruited from an online 
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marketplace (www.MTurk.com) completed the study in exchange for $1.00 payment. Previous 
research (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011) has shown that the data obtained from 
MTurk participants are as reliable as those obtained via traditional methods.     
 After participants filled out the agency-communion scale, they completed the episodic 
power priming task used in Study 1.16
 
 Subsequently, they completed the financial risk taking 
task as described below. Following Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko (2009), participants 
were also presented with a task designed to detect those who were not following instructions (see 
Appendix E). Seven participants who failed the instructional manipulation check were discarded 
from the sample. 
3.3.2     Measures 
 
 
Agency-communion orientation. Agency-communion was again measured using the 16-item 
agency-communion scale (αagency = .76 and αcommunion = .80). Then, each participants’ ACDIF 
score was calculated as defined in Study 1.  
Financial risk taking. Participants were asked to imagine that they have participated in a 
charity event where they could play “Odd-Even?”, which is a game of chance based on correctly 
guessing whether the winning number is odd or even (see Appendix F). If they guess correctly, 
they double amount they bet, otherwise they lose the bet. They were told that the amount they 
lose went to the charity. They were also asked to imagine that they have $100 to bet. Further, 
participants assigned to the high self-benefit condition were told that they could keep 75% of 
                                                 
16 A pre-test conducted with MTurk subjects revealed that the power manipulation worked as intended. Following 
Duguid and Goncalo (2012), upon completing the episodic power priming task, the pre-test participants  were asked 
to indicate to what extent they agree with the following statements on a seven-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 
= Strongly Agree): “I feel powerful”, “I feel influential”, “I feel unimportant” (R), “I feel subordinate” (R), α = 0.85. 
As expected, the participants in the high power condition felt more powerful than those in the low power condition 
(MHigh-Power = 4.91 vs. MLow-Power = 4.16, p < .01).  
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their winnings in a particular game, whereas 25% of their winnings were automatically donated 
to the charity. On the other hand, participants in the low self-benefit condition were informed 
that they could only keep 25% of their winnings in a play, while 75% of their winnings went to 
the charity. Each participant then indicated whether they would bet on odd or even in their first 
play along with how much they would bet. The amount wagered by participants is used as the 
measure of their financial risk taking tendency.  
 
3.3.3     Results and Discussion  
 
 
Eleven participants who failed to complete the power manipulation task were excluded from the 
analysis. I also excluded twenty participants who indicated that they are against gambling even if 
it is for a good cause, leaving 307 usable responses for the analysis.17
 The results were analyzed with OLS where the dependent variable is the amount wagered 
by participants. The independent variables are power condition (contrast coded: 1 for high-
power, -1 for low-power), self-benefit condition (contrast coded: 1 for high self-benefit, -1 for 
low self-benefit), ACDIF (mean-centered), and their two-way and three-way interactions. The 
regression model also includes gender and age as covariates (R2 = 7.4%, VIFs < 1.12). As 
predicted, there is a significant three-way interaction among power, self-benefit, and ACDIF (β = 
2.25, p < .05). The power x self-benefit interaction is also significant (β = 3.20, p < .05). Further, 
there is a marginally significant interaction between ACDIF and self-benefit (β = 2.05, p = .06). 
 The mean (median) bet 
amount is $28.91 ($21.00). There is no significant difference in the amount wagered between the 
high and low self-benefit conditions (Mhigh = $30.14 vs. Mlow = $27.65, t = 0.95, ns).  
                                                 
17 Keeping these participants in the sample reduces the significance of the results but the direction and magnitude of 
the documented effects remain essentially unchanged.  
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No other effects are significant. To facilitate the interpretation of the three-way interaction, I 
follow the post-hoc probing procedure recommended by Aiken and West (1991; see Figure 3.2).  
 
 
 
High Self Benefit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Self Benefit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Three-Way Interaction among Social Power, Agency-Communion and the Level of 
Self-Benefit Derived from the Risky Financial Decision 
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Replicating the result of the first study, the simple slope for high ACDIF (i.e., agentic) 
and high self-benefit is positive and significant (b = 6.495, t = 2.37, p < .05). That is, agentic 
individuals again are more risk seeking when they experience a sense of power and the risky 
financial decision they make offers high benefit for them. On the other hand, the simple slope for 
low ACDIF (i.e., communal) and high self-benefit is insignificant (b = 1.706, t = 0.64, ns). More 
important, the simple slope for high ACDIF and low self-benefit is negative and significant (b = 
-5.421, t = -2.06, p < .05). This finding suggests that when the potential self-benefit associated 
with the risky decision is low, agentic individuals with high versus low power actually take less 
financial risk. However, the simple slope for low ACDIF and low self-benefit is insignificant (b 
= 0.825, t = 0.32, ns), indicating that having power versus lacking it does not have any impact on 
financial risk taking tendency of communal individuals regardless of the level of self-benefit.  
This study sheds light on the process underlying the interactive influence of social power 
and agency-communion orientation on individuals’ risk seeking in their financial choices. The 
results suggest that agentic individuals with high power make riskier financial decisions only 
when the benefit they obtain from a risky decision is high enough. In fact, when the outcome of a 
particular risky financial decision does not provide enough benefit to the self, agentic individuals 
with high power exhibit less risk seeking. On the other hand, consistent with the notion that 
possession of power leads communal individuals to act responsibly, having power versus lacking 
it does not induce greater financial risk taking among communal individuals irrespective of the 
amount of personal benefit derived from putting their money at risk. 
At the first glance, the pattern of behavior exhibited by communal participants in this 
study may seem to be inconsistent with their caring nature. In particular, one might argue that 
communal participants with high power are expected to risk a higher amount in the low self-
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benefit condition. The lack of support for this argument can be attributed to two reasons. First, 
using risky financial instruments with uncertain outcomes may not be an appropriate vehicle for 
communal individuals to display their nurturance. Second, the fact that the game offers a 
potential material benefit to the self (either high or low) distinguishes it from directly donating 
money to a charity. So, the personal benefit offered by the game may prevent communal 
participants from betting a higher amount regardless of their power. In fact, positive but 
marginally significant interaction between ACDIF and the level of self-benefit is consistent with 
this explanation (i.e., lower ACDIF, i.e., communal, participants are at least directionally more 
willing to take higher risk in the low versus high self-benefit condition as shown in Figure 2).18
Study 3 is designed to provide further evidence on the underlying mechanism of the 
documented effect via mediation analysis. I maintain that agentic individuals with high versus 
low power tend to promote their own interests (i.e., enhance their wealth), whereas communal 
individuals refrain from doing so. In other words, having power over others affects agentics’ 
propensity to make risky financial decisions through increased pursuit of self-interest goals. In 
the next study, I test this proposed indirect effect of power and agency-communion interaction 
on financial risk taking.   
 
 
 
 
3.4     STUDY 3 
 
 
3.4.1     Method 
 
 
Study 3 employs a 2 (social power: high vs. low) x 2 (orientation: agency vs. communion) 
between-subjects experimental design. Power was again manipulated using the episodic priming 
                                                 
18 Further, Winterich et al. (2009) document that the donation behavior of communal individuals is affected by 
various factors such as individual differences in moral identity and the type of donation targets (i.e., in-group versus 
out-group). Since the current research focuses on self-benefit of risk taking in the financial domain, addressing these 
issues is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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task. Agency-communion orientation was measured (αagency = .76 and αcommunion = .80). And, each 
participant’s ACDIF score was calculated as defined previously. Eighty seven undergraduate 
students (33 female, 54 male) registered for an introductory marketing course at a large mid-
Atlantic university completed the study in exchange for course credit.  
 After completing the power manipulation, participants indicated to what extent they agree 
with the following statements intended to measure the degree to which they associate power with 
self-interest goals: “Power should be used to benefit the self” and “Unless it is used to benefit the 
self, having power is meaningless” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree), α = 0.61. 
 
3.4.2     Measures 
 
 
Financial risk taking. Participants’ risk seeking in their financial decisions was measured using a 
task adapted from He et al. (2008) and Levav and Argo (2010). Participants were asked to 
imagine that they have saved $5,000 over the last few years and were considering two 
investment vehicles for their savings: (1) a bank account that offers a guaranteed return of 4%, 
and (2) a stock fund that offers 45% chance of generating a return of 16%, 10% chance of 
generating a return of 4%, and 45% chance of incurring a loss of 8% (i.e., a return of -8%). They 
were asked to allocate their savings between the two investment vehicles. I reasoned that the 
percentage of wealth invested in the stock fund increases with risk seeking because the stock 
fund offers the potential of generating a higher return but has a possibility of a loss. On the other 
hand, a modest return is guaranteed for the bank account.   
 
 
3.4.3     Results and Discussion 
 
 
Three participants who failed to complete the power manipulation task are excluded from the 
analysis, leaving 84 usable responses for the analysis. The mean (median) percentage of savings 
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invested in the stock fund by participants is 36.44% (30.00%). The results were analyzed using 
OLS where the dependent variable is the percentage investment in the stock fund and the 
independent variables are power condition (contrast coded), ACDIF (mean-centered), and their 
interaction (R2 = 13.2%, VIFs < 1.11). The regression model also includes gender as a covariate. 
As expected, there is a positive interaction between power and ACDIF (β = 6.00, p < .05; see 
Figure 3.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The Moderating Role of Agency-Communion on the Relation between Social Power 
and Financial Risk Taking 
 
 
 
 Replicating the results of prior studies, post-hoc analysis reveals that high-ACDIF (i.e., 
agentic) individuals with high power invest a higher percentage of their savings in the risky stock 
fund versus the bank account (b = 10.274, t = 2.51, p < .05), while the same effect is not 
observed among low-ACDIF (i.e., communal) individuals (b = -2.281, t = -0.55, ns). Next, I 
examine whether associating power with self-interest goals mediates the effect of power x 
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orientation interaction on financial risk taking. Consistent with my prediction, the analysis 
fulfills the criteria for a mediation model (Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010; see Figure 3.4).   
 
 
 
  
  
                                0.22*            (6.09*) 
 
 
6.00* (4.68) 
Notes: Numbers outside the parentheses are standardized regression coefficients; numbers 
inside the parentheses are simultaneous regression coefficients. The estimated 95% 
confidence interval around the indirect effect of Power x ACDIF on % allocated to the stock 
fund through pursuit of self-interest goals does not contain zero (0.12 to 4.40). An asterisk 
indicates a p-value less than 0.05.   
 
  
Figure 3.4: The Mediation Analysis 
 
 
 
 First, as reported above, the interaction between power and agency-communion 
orientation significantly impacts participants’ tendency to take financial risk. Second, power x 
ACDIF interaction significantly predicts the extent to which participants link power with self-
interest goals (β = 0.22, p = .05). That is, having versus lacking power increases the tendency of 
agentic, but not communal, individuals to promote their self-interests. Finally, including pursuit 
of self-interest goals as an independent variable in the main regression model significantly 
reduces the effect of power x ACDIF interaction (β = 4.68, p > .10), while the effect of pursuit of 
self-interest goals is significant (β = 6.09, p < .05). I formally test the mediation model using 
Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) macro with 5,000 bootstrapped samples as recommended by Zhao 
et al. (2010). The indirect effect of power x ACDIF interaction on financial risk seeking through 
 
Power x ACDIF 
 
 
Pursuit of Self-
Interest Goals 
 
 
% Invested in the Stock Fund 
 
63 
 
pursuit of self-interest goals is significant, with the 95% confidence interval excluding zero 
(0.12, 4.40).    
 Study 3 provides further evidence on the underlying mechanism of the interactive effect 
of power and agency-communion orientation on individuals’ tendency to make risky financial 
decisions. In particular, pursuit of self-interest goals mediates the positive impact of having 
versus lacking power over others on agentic individuals’ financial risk taking. This result is 
consistent with my thesis that having power over others leads agentic individuals to act in a self-
enhancing manner, namely taking higher risk to increase their own wealth. However, this effect 
is not observed among communal individuals, who refrain from promoting their self-interests 
when having power.   
 
 
 
3.5     GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Power is a force that touches on different facets of human life. One intriguing aspect of social 
power is that the possession of power over others does not only shape our social interactions but 
also our individual preferences and choices that do not have a direct impact on others. The 
present research explores a major aspect of consumer welfare that is affected by whether or not 
people have social power, i.e., financial risk taking. Across three studies, I document that the 
impact of power on individuals’ risk seeking in their financial choices is contingent upon 
whether they are agency-oriented or communion-oriented. Specifically, agentic individuals, who 
tend to associate power with self-interest goals, make riskier financial decisions when they have 
power versus lack power over others. On the other hand, communal individuals, who tend to link 
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power with responsibility goals, refrain from taking greater financial risk when they experience a 
sense of power.  
 The asymmetric impact of social power on financial risk taking of agentic and communal 
individuals is due to differences in their self-orientation. Among agentic individuals, the 
possession of power is expected to elicit behavior that mainly focuses on promoting one’s self-
interests (Chen et al. 2001). Hence, agentic individuals possessing power tend to make riskier 
financial choices, which have the potential to enhance their personal wealth and thereby enable 
them to live up to their status and powerful position. Accordingly, I document that having power 
versus lacking it leads to greater financial risk seeking among agentic individuals only when the 
potential personal benefit they derive from putting their money at risk is high enough. On the 
other hand, agentic individuals with high power are willing to take less financial risk when the 
risky decision they make provides only a modest level of personal benefit. As opposed to its self-
promoting impact on agentic individuals, the possession of power among communal individuals 
is expected to elicit behavior that reflects responsibility (Chen et al. 2001). Consequently, 
regardless of the level of self-benefit derived from a risky financial decision, communal 
individuals with high power do not seek higher risk as compared to those with low power. As an 
additional support on the proposed underlying mechanism, I find that the interactive influence of 
power and agency-communion orientation on financial risk taking is mediated by pursuit of self-
interest goals.  
 These findings primarily extend our current understanding of the role of social power in 
consumer behavior. Previous research has demonstrated that powerful and powerless consumers 
differ in terms of their consumption and spending patterns. I add to this stream of literature by 
documenting that the possession of power impacts how consumers manage their wealth in the 
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face of risk and uncertainty. The main contribution of the present research lies in the fact that 
power induced changes in the financial risk seeking behavior can significantly affect not only 
current but also future spending ability of consumers. On the one hand, increased risk seeking 
can generate higher financial gains, enabling risk takers to command greater wealth and power. 
On the other hand, excessive risk seeking can have a detrimental impact on consumers’ welfare 
(and thus their status) if individuals realize losses on their investments. Future research should 
explore the possibility that agentic individuals with high power avoid risk seeking in the 
financial domain if their attention is directed to potential losses associated with a risky monetary 
decision. It would also be interesting to examine how the impact of social power on financial risk 
taking changes when agentic and communal consumers make risky decisions on behalf of others 
rather than put their own wealth at risk. Another potentially fruitful avenue for future research is 
to investigate the interactive effect of power and agency-communion orientation on risk taking 
outside the financial domain such as health. Given that agency involves placing high emphasis 
on one’s own well-being, powerful agentic individuals may be less likely to engage in risky 
health behaviors, which would pose a threat to their well-being and thus power.   
 This research also contributes to the growing body of literature examining how 
interactions with others impact individuals’ willingness to take financial risk. Previous research 
documents that physical contact (Levav and Argo 2010) and participation in an online 
community (Zhu et al. 2012) result in greater financial risk raking. This effect stems from an 
illusionary sense of security and perceived support. In this paper, I document that a sense of 
power over others, a social force which often has negative connotations, also affects the level of 
financial risk individuals are willing to take. In particular, agentic individuals’ desire to maintain 
the status associated with power and highlight the differentiation of the self from others through 
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increased wealth leads them to make riskier financial choices. Thus, the current study extends the 
prior research focusing on social interactions and risk taking behavior in the financial domain.     
 This study also complements and extends the work of He et al. (2008) who document that 
higher issue capability (i.e., the extent to which decision makers perceive that they have the 
resources or skills to resolve an issue) increases financial risk seeking among agentic but not 
communal individuals. The authors argue that agentic individuals are more sensitive to 
achievement of gains than communal individuals and that the compatibility between their 
achievement focus and the nature of investment task makes issue capability more relevant in 
determining the extent to which agentic individuals take financial risk. While He et al. (2008) 
focus on issue capability, a non-social construct, I examine how having control over others’ 
actions and resources impact individuals’ risky financial decisions. Relatedly, my theoretical 
framework is based on the differences in agentic and communal individuals’ strivings for status 
and wealth. Accordingly, I find that promoting the interests of the self leads agentic individuals 
with high (versus low) power to make riskier financial decisions. In particular, when self-benefit 
obtained from the risky choice is low, agentic individuals with high (versus low) power actually 
exhibit less risk seeking behavior. This suggests that the underlying processes for the 
documented effects of issue capability and social power on agentic individuals’ financial risk 
taking propensity are different.        
 The findings of the present research are also of interest to practitioners. For instance, 
financial advisors may be better able to serve their clients by recognizing that agentic investors 
are more willing to accept financial risk when they take positions of power (e.g., a recent 
promotion at work). Accordingly, agentic investors may be willing to increase the share of 
riskier financial assets (e.g., stocks and options) in their investment portfolios. Further, as 
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defined at the outset of the paper, powerful people control valued resources and have the 
capacity to influence other people’s welfare. For example, an agency-oriented CEO whose 
personal wealth is directly tied to corporate level outcomes may overinvest in highly risky 
projects, which may in turn negatively impact firm value and thus, the welfare of investors and 
other employees. In general, given that high status roles in organizations demand more emphasis 
on agentic qualities as compared to low status roles (Eagly 1987), organizations may benefit 
from having an understanding of how power and the level of personal benefit managers derive 
from organizational outcomes interact to influence managers’ tendency to make risky financial 
decisions.      
Power plays a pervasive role in people’s everyday lives as they are constantly segmented 
into powerful versus powerless roles. Thus, it is important to further our understanding of the 
impact of social power on individuals’ consumption and spending habits. In the present research, 
I took an important step towards achieving this goal by examining how experiencing a sense of 
power affects consumers’ wealth management in the face of risk and uncertainty. 
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4.0     ESSAY 3: SEEING THINGS FROM THE OTHER GUY’S POINT OF VIEW: 
 
SELF-OTHER DIFFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF ENDOWMENT 
 
 
 
 
People do not make decisions in a social vacuum. Perspective taking shapes our perception of the 
world around us and thus, our consumption decisions. However, an accurate understanding of 
others’ perspective cannot always be easily achieved (Van Boven and Loewenstein 2005). For 
instance, Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2000) report that although consumers exhibit 
the endowment effect, they fail to recognize its impact on others’ preferences—both owners and 
buyers underestimate the dissimilarity between their valuations of an object and the valuation of 
those in the opposite role. The thesis of our research is that consumers are so prone to 
perspective taking errors that even being in the shoes of others (e.g., being an owner and 
estimating the valuation of other owners) does not enable consumers to accurately predict others’ 
valuations. Accordingly, the goal of this research is to examine the economic magnitude of failed 
perspective taking among consumers assuming the same role in the context of endowment.  
Van Boven, Loewenstein and Dunning (2003, p. 352) point out: “Given the importance 
of the endowment effect for everyday economic behavior, people’s perceptions of the 
endowment effect may be similarly important.” Our research offers new insights regarding 
individuals’ perception of the impact of endowment (and lack of ownership) on others by 
investigating whether owners and buyers systematically mispredict the valuation of an object by 
others in the same role. This is an important question to address. For example, when setting an 
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asking price for a commodity, a seller should consider not only how much potential buyers 
would pay for it, but also the reservation price of other sellers. In parallel, a prospective home 
buyer has an interest in both estimating the home owner’s lowest selling price and other potential 
buyers’ maximum purchase price.  
Biased predictions of the valuation of others in the same role may lead sellers and buyers 
to engage in transactions that are suboptimal (e.g., buyers may overbid). In addition, post-
transaction upward external comparisons in trading (e.g., Is the price I paid higher than the price 
others in a similar situation paid?) have been shown to negatively impact both buyers’ and 
sellers’ satisfaction with a transaction (Novemsky and Schweitzer 2004). Thus, it is important for 
prospective sellers and buyers to engage in accurate perspective taking before determining their 
asking price and offer price, respectively. 
 In an interesting study, Van Boven et al. (2000) document that people who do not own an 
object systematically underestimate how much other people who own the object will require to 
part with it. They also find that people who do own an object overestimate how much those who 
do not own the object will pay to acquire it. The authors attribute these findings to empathy gaps 
between owners and buyers. In this paper, we argue that eliminating these interrole empathy 
gaps among consumers (e.g., asking owners, rather than buyers to predict the valuation of 
owners) does not enable them to correctly predict the valuations of others. We base our 
prediction on previous research suggesting that empathy gaps persist even among those in the 
same role (i.e., intrarole empathy gaps) such that individuals tend to underestimate the intensity 
of affective states held by others who are in similar situations as the self, as well as the impact of 
affective experiences on others’ preferences and choices (e.g., Loewenstein 1996; Van Boven, 
Loewenstein, and Dunning 2005; Faro and Rottenstreich 2006).  
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We maintain that intrarole empathy gaps impair consumers’ perspective taking in the 
context of endowment, resulting in a self-other difference in the value function. Further, since 
owners and buyers tend to focus on what each stands to forgo in the potential exchange—the 
object and the money, respectively— (Carmon and Ariely 2000), we contend that the self-other 
gap in valuation manifests itself in opposite directions between the two groups. In particular, we 
argue that owners fail to appreciate the extent to which endowment (and thus, forfeiting the item 
in an exchange and not getting to enjoy its benefits) affects other owners’ valuations. 
Accordingly, we predict that owners will underestimate the average selling price demanded by 
other owners. On the other hand, we maintain that buyers underrate the extent to which lack of 
ownership (and thus, giving up money to obtain the ownership of the item) impacts other buyers’ 
valuations. Thus, we predict that buyers overestimate the average purchase price offered by other 
buyers. In conjunction, biased estimations by both groups will translate into failed prediction of 
the endowment effect.  
We report the results of three experiments that test our thesis. In studies 1A and 1B, we 
examine whether owners and buyers accurately predict how valuable a coffee mug would be to 
other people in the same role. Our results show that the predictions of both groups are 
significantly biased in the hypothesized directions. Participants fail to anticipate the impact of 
endowment and lack of ownership on others’ preferences, even when they estimate the 
valuations of those in the same role they have been assigned to. This finding extends the 
previous literature by documenting that people cannot accurately predict the endowment effect 
even in the absence of interrole empathy gaps. In study 2, we manipulate the degree of 
participants’ perceived similarity to other participants to test our prediction that this attenuates 
the magnitude of the bias in their predictions. Our findings reveal that when owners and buyers 
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consider their similarity to other owners and buyers, respectively, their mispredictions of others’ 
valuation are attenuated. Further, we provide evidence supporting our proposed underlying 
mechanism by documenting that greater perspective taking (i.e., the cognitive capacity to 
consider the world from others’ viewpoints) is associated with lower estimation errors when 
participants are high, but not low, in empathy (i.e., the ability to connect emotionally with other 
individuals). We achieve this by measuring perspective taking in study 3 and manipulating it in 
study 4.  
Our research makes three important contributions to the literature. First, we document 
evidence of self-other differences in valuation and discuss their practical implications. Second, 
we study a previously unexplored dimension of perspective taking among owners and buyers― 
biases in their intrarole comparative valuation judgments. Third, we document that the success 
of consumers’ perspective taking attempts depends, at least in part, on their empathic ability in 
the context of endowment. Next, we present our conceptual development and derive testable 
hypotheses. We then describe the studies and present our results. We conclude with a general 
discussion of the implications of our results and directions for future research. 
 
 
 
4.1     CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Previous research (i.e., Loewenstein and Adler 1995; Van Boven et al. 2000) has examined 
interrole perspective taking in the context of endowment. First, in a series of studies, 
Loewenstein and Adler (1995) investigate whether potential owners who did not possess an 
object could anticipate the endowment effect. In one study, after the authors elicited hypothetical 
selling prices for a coffee mug from subjects who did not own the mug, they endowed these 
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subjects with mugs and elicited their actual selling prices. The results show that subjects 
underestimate how much they would require to sell their mugs by 30% (averaged across two 
samples reported in the same study). In another study, the authors develop an index of prediction 
bias, calculated as follows: 
      β = 
(𝑠−𝑠′)(𝑠−𝑐)      (1) 
 
where, s and s´ represent the minimum selling price for the mug stated by actual owners and 
potential owners, respectively, and c stands for choosers’ highest price at which they would 
choose to receive the mug rather than money. The value of the index depends on how much 
potential owners anticipate the endowment effect: β equals 0 (i.e., s´= s) for those who correctly 
predict the endowment effect, and 1 (i.e., s´= c) for those who anticipate no endowment effect. 
The average β is 0.84, indicating a prediction bias of 84%. In other words, only 16% of the true 
impact of the endowment effect is reflected in hypothetical selling prices of potential owners. 
Overall, two studies show that individuals fail to recognize how much they would attach to 
objects once they possess these objects. That is, they underestimate the impact of the endowment 
on their own preferences.  Loewenstein and Adler note that (p. 936): “It would be interesting to 
test whether people with objects overpredict the buying prices or choice values of those without 
such objects.” 
 Building on Loewenstein and Adler’s work, Van Boven et al. (2000) assess owners’ and 
buyers’ predictions of one another’s reservation prices. They find that subjects who are endowed 
with a coffee mug (i.e., owners) significantly overestimate the maximum purchase price stated 
by subjects who were not endowed with a mug (i.e., buyers). On the other hand, buyers 
underestimate owners’ minimum selling price. For instance, across two studies, they report an 
average underestimation of 28% in buyers’ estimations. The authors conclude that “egocentric 
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empathy gaps” between owners and buyers lead them to mispredict the impact of the endowment 
effect on preferences of others in the opposite role. In order to compare owners’ and buyers’ 
egocentric empathy gaps, the authors construct egocentrism indices as follows: 
               γo = 
(𝑏′− 𝑏)(𝑠−𝑏)                 (2a) 
 
               γb = 
(𝑠− 𝑠′)(𝑠−𝑏)                 (2b) 
 
where b and b´ represent the actual valuation of buyers and the owners’ prediction of average 
buyer’s maximum purchase price, respectively. Analogously, s and s´ represent the actual 
valuation of owners and the buyers’ prediction of average owner’s minimum selling price, 
respectively. The index equals 0 if a participant correctly predicts the other role’s valuation. It 
increases with the participant’s underestimation of the endowment effect and becomes 1 when 
the participant is completely unaware of the endowment effect. Van Boven et al. (2000) find that 
egocentrism scores are significantly positive for both owners and buyers. Across two studies, 
egocentrism indices of owners (γo) and buyers (γb) are both equal to 0.39, suggesting that both 
groups underestimate the endowment effect by 39%.  
 Individuals’ misperceptions about the endowment effect are expected to have important 
practical implications since, as pointed out by Hastie and Dawes (2001, p. 308), “the endowment 
effect is surely part of the explanation for the malfunction of some markets in which trading 
occurs at inefficiently slow rates.” Relatedly, Van Boven et al. (2003) document that since 
“buyer’s agents” (i.e., study participants who make the offer on behalf of the experimenter) 
underestimate the impact of the endowment effect on owners’ selling prices, they make 
suboptimally low offers to buy an object from an owner, leaving them with less money than they 
could have made. 
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 Although previous research has documented the role of interrole (i.e., non-owner vs. 
owner) empathy gaps in shaping people’s perceptions of the impact of the endowment effect on 
both their own and other people’s preferences, it has not been documented whether people can 
correctly anticipate the impact of endowment and lack of ownership on consumers in the absence 
of interrole empathy gaps. It is possible that perspective taking even among those who are in the 
same role may be impaired due to individuals’ tendency to underestimate the similarity between 
their own perceptions and the perceptions of others who are in the same psychological state 
(Dunning, Van Boven, and Loewenstein 2001). Accordingly, we hypothesize that even being in 
the shoes of other people—being an owner (buyer) and estimating the valuation of other owners 
(buyers)― does not necessarily help people accurately predict the valuations of those in the same 
role. This failure in turn leads to misprediction of the endowment effect.  
 Our thesis is based on previous research (e.g., Loewenstein 1996, Van Boven et al. 2005; 
Faro and Rottenstreich 2006) documenting that people underestimate the extent to which an 
affective experience influences preferences and behaviors of others in the same situation as 
themselves, giving rise to intrarole empathy gaps. This stream of literature proposes that people 
tend to believe that others in the same role experience less intense emotional reactions than they 
actually do and that emotional reactions experienced by others have less impact on their choices 
than they actually do. For instance, Van Boven et al. (2005) examine emotional perspective 
taking in the context of individuals’ predictions of others’ reactions to embarrassing situations 
and find that individuals systematically underestimate the impact of fear of embarrassment on 
others’ preferences and choices. In particular, they document that while participants, on average, 
required $53 to dance in front of an auditorium full of people to Rick James’ song “Super 
Freak”, they predicted that the average performance price stated by their classmates was only 
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$19. This finding suggests that people expect others to be more willing to dance in front of an 
audience (in exchange of money), which they actually consider as a potentially embarrassing 
situation. The authors conclude that while people view public performances as inherently 
uncomfortable, both to the self and to others, they unrealistically believe that the reaction of 
others to such uncomfortable situations is somewhat different than that of the self.    
 Furthermore, Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) investigate how accurate people are in 
predicting others’ decisions under risk. They maintain that although people experience such 
feelings as hope, anxiety, and fear when confronting risky decisions, they underestimate the 
extent to which others in the same situation feel similar emotions and make decisions based on 
these emotions. Accordingly, they document that such emotional empathy gaps among 
individuals translate into a self-other difference in the probability weighting function of prospect 
theory. In particular, Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) find that people do not properly anticipate 
others’ overweighting and underweighting, leading them to underestimate others’ tendency to 
take risk when they are themselves risk seeking in the same situation and overestimate others’ 
risk aversion when they are themselves risk averse in the same situation.  To illustrate, the 
median participant in their sample was indifferent between a sure gain of $10 ($3,250) and the 
chance of winning $4,000 with 0.01% (99%) probability but predicted that another participant 
would ask for $5 ($3,900) in the same situation. Furthermore, they find that people’s 
mispredictions of others’ probability weighting in the same role covary with the closeness of the 
target and individual differences in empathy, supporting their proposition that empathy gaps 
among those in the same role prevent people from accurately predicting others’ decisions under 
risk. In a related study, Burson, Faro, and Rottenstreich (2010) examine people’s predictions of 
others’ evaluations of incentive pay contracts and find that people mispredict not only others’ 
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weighting of probabilities but also their likelihood judgments (i.e., probability of completing a 
task).        
People’s tendency to mispredict the impact of affective experiences on others’ 
preferences and choices may also impair their accuracy in predicting how much others who are 
in the same situation as themselves value an object. As Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004, pp. 27-28) 
point out, “valuation is a complex process...most real-world valuations mix calculation and 
feeling.” Thus, in line with the framework proposed by Faro and Rottenstreich (2006), we 
maintain that the inability of the average owner and buyer to connect emotionally with others in 
the same role leads them to misstep into the shoes of others in the process of perspective taking, 
resulting in a self-other difference in the value function. Put differently, since people tend to 
underestimate the intensity of emotional states held by others, they are expected to predict that 
others’ choices will exhibit a more muted form of the value function, particularly in the domain 
of losses as owners and buyers tend to focus on what each stands to forego in the potential 
exchange—the object and the money, respectively (Carmon and Ariely 2000).  
We argue that self-other differences in valuation arising from intrarole empathy gaps will 
prevent consumers from correctly anticipating the reservation prices of others in the same role. 
Specifically, when consumers own an object, they will underestimate how much other owners 
would require to part with the same object. That is, owners incorrectly surmise that the disutility 
of forfeiting an object will be lower for others as compared to themselves (i.e., their value 
function lies below the predicted value function of other owners in the domain of losses). On the 
other hand, consumers who are not endowed with an object will fail to realize the extent to which 
lack of ownership affects preferences of other buyers such that they will underestimate the 
amount of disutility (or pain) others experience from the payment required to obtain the object. 
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In other words, when consumers do not own an object, they overestimate how much money 
others would be willing to give up to acquire the object. Formally: 
H1a: Owners will underestimate the actual minimum selling price stated by other 
owners. 
 
H1b: Buyers will overestimate the actual maximum purchase price stated by other 
buyers. 
 
H1c:  Due to H1a and H1b, when estimating the valuations of others in the same role, 
owners and buyers will not anticipate the endowment effect.  
 
 
 
 
4.2     STUDY 1A 
 
 
For the initial investigation of whether individuals make biased predictions of the valuation of 
others in the same role, we built on the methodology of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) 
and Van Boven et al. (2000). One group of participants (“owners”) who were endowed with a 
university coffee mug indicated the lowest price at which they would be willing to sell their 
mugs.19
                                                 
19 In the endowment effect studies, the terms “owners” and “sellers” are used to define the group of participants who 
own an object and are asked to indicate their willingness to sell the object at different prices. For ease of exposition, 
we use the term “owners” throughout the paper.   
 After they indicated their selling prices, participants estimated the average lowest price 
at which other owners would be willing to sell their mugs. In a separate session, another group of 
participants (“buyers”) who were not endowed with mugs indicated the highest price at which 
they would be willing to receive the mug instead of that amount of cash. After they indicated 
their own prices, participants estimated the average highest price at which other buyers would 
choose to receive the mug instead of cash. Note that technically we are eliciting choice prices 
instead of buying prices and thus, the participants in the “buyer” condition are actually choosers. 
This helps us control for income effects or cash constraints (Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 
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2004).  Following previous literature (e.g., Morewedge et al. 2009; Peck and Shu 2009), we refer 
to these participants as “buyers” rather than “choosers” for ease of exposition.  
 
4.2.1     Method  
 
 
Fifty undergraduate students registered for two sections of a marketing course at a large mid-
Atlantic university participated in the study. There were twenty-nine students in the “owner” 
session and twenty-one students in the “buyer” session. Owners were given a dark blue porcelain 
coffee mug with the university’s name and logo on it along with the following written 
instructions: 
You now own a university mug that is yours to keep and take home. In a few minutes, 
you and other participants of this study will have an opportunity to sell the mug to the 
experimenter in exchange for cash. For each of the prices below, please indicate whether 
you choose to: (1) receive that amount of money and return the mug to the experimenter, 
or (2) not sell the mug at that price. The experimenter will randomly select one of the 
prices listed below and your choice for that price will be honored. 
 
Buyers were shown the identical coffee mug and given the following instructions: 
 
You now do not own a university mug that is yours to keep and take home. In a few 
minutes, however, you and other participants of this study will have an opportunity to 
receive a mug from the experimenter or some amount of cash. For each of the prices 
below, please indicate whether you choose to: (1) receive a mug from the experimenter, 
or (2) receive that amount of money instead of a mug. The experimenter will randomly 
select one of the prices listed below and your choice for that price will be honored. 
  
 Owners indicated for each price on a list of prices ranging from $0.50 to $10.00 (in $0.50 
increments) whether they would sell their mugs. Buyers indicated for every price on the same list 
whether they would choose to receive the mug or receive that amount of cash. Neither owners 
nor buyers were told that the mug was sold for $6.95 at the university bookstore. Owners’ 
valuation of the mug was defined to be the lowest price at which they would sell their mug, 
whereas buyers’ valuation was specified to be the highest price at which they would choose to 
receive the mug instead of that amount of cash.   
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 After indicating their own valuation, participants estimated the average valuation of other 
participants in the same role. Owners read the following: “Please estimate, on average, the 
lowest price at which other participants of this study will be willing to sell the mug”, whereas 
buyers read the following: “Please also estimate, on average, the highest price at which other 
participants of this study will choose to receive the mug instead of that amount of cash.” In order 
to provide an incentive for accuracy, they were offered a $2.00 reward if their estimation was 
within $0.50 of the actual average valuation. After all the participants completed and returned 
their surveys, the randomly selected price was announced by the experimenter and all resulting 
transactions were conducted.  
  
4.2.2     Results  
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Actual and Estimated Average Reservation Prices  
 
 
CONDITION 
ACTUAL 
(1) 
ESTIMATED 
(2) 
DIFFERENCE* 
(2) – (1) 
OWNER 
(n=29) $5.34 $4.32 
-$1.02 
(t = -2.93, p < .01) 
BUYER 
(n=21) $3.14 $3.94 
  $0.80 
(t = 1.98, p < .05) 
     *one-tailed test is used to test these predictions.  
 
 
 
 As reported in Table 4.1, we find a significant endowment effect; the average lowest 
selling price (Mowners-actual = $5.34) is higher than the average buying price (Mbuyers-actual = $3.14), 
t(48) = 3.44, p < .01. More importantly, consistent with H1a, owners underestimated the average 
lowest selling price stated by other owners (Mowners-estimated = $4.32). The average 
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underestimation, which is the average of owners’ individual estimation errors (i.e., estimated 
average minus actual average of selling prices of other owners), is -$1.02, t(28) = -2.93, p < 
.01.20
 We also calculate adjusted valuations of both owners and buyers. That is, for an owner, 
we subtract his or her estimation of the average lowest selling price of other owners from his or 
her own selling price. Similarly, for a buyer, we subtract his or her estimation of the average 
buying price of other buyers from his or her own buying price. This procedure yields two 
valuation components for each participant: (1) adjusted valuation (i.e., own price - estimated 
average) and (2) estimated market valuation (i.e., estimated average). Consistent with H1c, the 
results show that there is no significant difference in the estimated market valuations between 
owners and buyers (Mowners-estimated = $4.32 vs. Mbuyers-estimated = $3.94), t(48) = .72, ns. On the 
other hand, the difference in the adjusted valuations between two groups is statistically 
significant (Mowners -adjusted = $1.02 vs. Mbuyers-adjusted = -$0.80), t(48) = 3.16, p < .01. These results 
suggest that when estimating other people’s valuations, the participants do not anticipate the 
endowment effect. It is the significant difference in the adjusted (or personal) valuations of the 
two groups that drives the endowment effect.  
 That is, owners, on average, underestimated the valuation of other owners by 19%. On the 
other hand, buyers overestimated the average highest buying price stated by other buyers (Mbuyers-
estimated = $3.94), supporting H1b.  The average overestimation, which is the average of buyers’ 
individual estimation errors, is $0.80, t(20) = 1.98, p < .05. This suggests that buyers, on average, 
overestimated the valuation of other buyers by 26%.  
 An integrated index of anticipation of the endowment effect by the participants is shown 
below: 
                                                 
20 Since we had clear directional predictions and theoretical justification for these predictions, all reported p-values 
are based on one-tailed test. However, using two-tailed test does not change our conclusions.   
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   I = 
( 𝑠′− 𝑏′)(𝑠−𝑏)                                              (2) 
where, b and b´ represent the average actual and predicted maximum purchase price of buyers, 
respectively. s and s´ represent the average actual and predicted minimum selling price of 
owners, respectively. The lower the index, the higher the underestimation of the endowment 
effect. In our study, the index is equal to 0.17 [($4.32 - $3.94) / ($5.34 - $3.14)], suggesting that 
the participants underestimate the true impact of the endowment effect on preferences of others 
in the same role by 83%. To provide a sense of the substantiveness of our results, we also 
calculate the index of Van Boven et al. (2000)― equations 2a and 2b― for our sample as if the 
prediction of owners’ minimum selling price (buyers’ maximum purchase price) was provided 
by owners (buyers) on behalf of buyers (owners). Remember that in Van Boven et al.’s study, 
buyers and owners are asked to predict the reservation prices of those in the other role. Using 
Van Boven et al.’s indices enables us to see what happens if a buyer does not himself predict the 
minimum selling price of owners, but rather he asks for help from an owner (since she will have 
a better understating of the psychological state of owners) to predict the average minimum 
selling price. If owners have an advantage over buyers to predict the valuations of owners, then 
our hypothetical calculation should generate a lower egocentrism score than that reported by Van 
Boven et al. We find egocentrism scores of 46% [($5.34 - $4.32) / ($5.34 - $3.14)] and 36% 
[($3.94 - $3.14) / ($5.34 - $3.14)] for owners and buyers, respectively. Comparing these figures 
to 39% reported for both groups by Van Boven et al. reveals that eliminating interrole empathy 
gaps does not help the participants at all in predicting the endowment effect with higher 
accuracy. 
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4.2.3     Discussion  
 
 
The results of study 1A reveal self-other differences in valuation. While owners, on average, 
require $5.34 to surrender their mugs, they predict that other owners would require only $4.32 to 
part with their mugs. On the other hand, buyers, on average, offer $3.14 for the mug, whereas 
they believe that other buyers would be willing to give up $3.94 for the same mug. Overall, the 
evidence supports our thesis that both owners and buyers make biased predictions of valuation of 
an object (i.e., mug) by others in the same role, but in opposite directions – buyers overestimate 
other buyers’ offer prices and owners underestimate other owners’ asking prices.  Notably, these 
prediction errors are documented despite the fact that a monetary incentive was offered for 
accurate prediction. The results also suggest that biased predictions of participants prevent them 
from anticipating the endowment effect.  
It is possible that participants’ own valuation may serve as a basis for predicting others’ 
valuations (Van Boven et al. 2000). Epley et al. (2004) document that people adopt others’ 
perspective by serially adjusting from their own and that their adjustments tend to be insufficient 
since they stop adjusting once a plausible estimate is reached. However, if both owners and 
buyers anchor on their own valuations while predicting others’ valuations, this makes it harder 
for us to find a systematic bias in their predictions. It is also hard to explain why anchoring-and-
adjustment would generate a negative prediction error in the case of owners, but a positive 
prediction error in the case of buyers. Nonetheless, in the next study, we use a between-subject 
experimental design where participants are randomly assigned to the valuation and estimation 
groups. And, we compare the figures provided by the two groups in the owner and buyer 
conditions.  
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4.3     STUDY 1B 
 
 
4.3.1     Method 
 
 
A 2 (owner vs. buyer) x 2 (valuation vs. estimation) between-subjects experimental design was 
employed. Ninety five undergraduate students registered for an introductory level marketing 
course at a large mid-Atlantic university participated in the study to receive course credit. There 
were forty eight students in the “owner” session and forty seven students in the “buyer” session. 
Participants reported to the lab, where sessions were run separately. They were randomly 
assigned to either the valuation or the estimation condition. The procedures regarding the selling 
and buying price elicitation were identical to those in study 1A. However, owners in the 
estimation condition were given the following instructions and asked to provide their estimation 
of other owners’ valuation using the same price list provided to the owners in the valuation 
condition:  
You now own a university mug that is yours to keep and take home. In a few minutes, 
you and other participants of this study will have an opportunity to sell the mug to the 
experimenter in exchange for cash. For each of the prices below, please indicate whether 
you think that other participants, on average, will choose to: (1) receive that amount of 
money and return the mug to the experimenter, or (2) not sell the mug at that price. The 
experimenter will randomly select one of the prices listed below and their choice for that 
price will be honored. 
 
Buyers were given the following instructions: 
 
You now do not own a university mug that is yours to keep and take home. In a few 
minutes, however, you and other participants of this study will have an opportunity to 
receive a mug from the experimenter or some amount of cash. For each of the prices 
below, please indicate whether you think that other participants, on average, will choose 
to: (1) receive a mug from the experimenter, or (2) receive that amount of money instead 
of a mug. The experimenter will randomly select one of the prices listed below and their 
choice for that price will be honored. 
 
 All the participants were again offered $2.00 reward for accurately estimating the 
valuation of others in the same role.   
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4.3.2    Results  
 
 
As reported in Table 4.2, owners’ and buyers’ valuations demonstrate an endowment effect; the 
average lowest selling price (Mowners-actual = $5.96) is higher than the average buying price 
(Mbuyers-actual = $2.76, t(46) = 6.13, p < .01). Also, replicating the results of our previous study, 
owners in the estimation condition significantly underestimated the average selling price of those 
in the valuation condition (Mowners-estimated = $4.91 vs. Mowners-actual = $5.96, t(45) = -2.13, p < .05), 
while buyers in the estimation condition overestimated the average buying price of those in the 
valuation condition (Mbuyers-estimated = $4.18 vs. Mbuyers-actual = $2.76, t(46) = 3.41, p < .01). These 
results again support our predictions.     
 
 
Table 4.2: Actual and Estimated Average Reservation Prices  
   
 
CONDITION 
ACTUAL 
(1) 
ESTIMATED 
(2) 
DIFFERENCE* 
(2) – (1) 
OWNER $5.96  (n=25) 
$4.91 
(n=22) 
-$1.05 
(t = -2.13, p < .05) 
BUYER $2.76 (n=23) 
$4.18 
(n=25) 
  $1.42 
(t = 3.41, p < .01) 
              
     *one-tailed test is used to test these predictions.  
      
 
 
4.3.3     Discussion  
 
 
This study demonstrates that participants’ estimation errors do not stem from an anchoring-and-
adjustment bias. In the next study, we examine whether increased perceived similarity to the 
target reduces the self-other gap in valuation and thereby enhances the accuracy of owners’ and 
buyers’ predictions. Previous research has shown that a higher level of perceived general 
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similarity to a target is associated with greater empathy (Batson et al. 1995; Krebs 1975; Stotland 
1969) and social projection (Ames 2004a, 2004b). It has also been suggested that perceived 
similarity may promote increased perspective taking (e.g., Batson and Shaw 1991). Krebs (1975, 
p. 1143) notes: “perception of similarity increases the disposition to imagine how one would feel 
in another’s place.” Accordingly, we argue that priming similarities between participants and 
comparison targets should enhance participants’ perspective taking tendency and empathy, 
attenuating the magnitude of documented errors in owners’ and buyers’ predictions of the 
valuations of others in the same role. Formally: 
H2:  Priming similarities between the self and the target will attenuate the negative 
estimation error (i.e., underestimation) exhibited by owners and the positive estimation 
error (i.e., overestimation) exhibited by buyers when predicting selling and purchase 
price of other owners and buyers, respectively. Consequently, when estimating the 
valuations of others in the same role, owners and buyers primed with similarity will 
anticipate the endowment effect.  
 
 
 
 
4.4     STUDY 2 
 
 
4.4.1     Method  
 
 
 A 2 (owners vs. buyers) x 2 (prime similarities vs. control) between-subjects design was 
employed. Eighty-two undergraduate students registered for two introductory level marketing 
courses at a large mid-Atlantic university participated in the study. There were thirty five 
students in the “owner” session and forty seven students in the “buyer” session. Participants in 
each session were randomly assigned to either the similarity or the control condition.  Following 
previous studies (Menon, Kyung, and Agrawal 2009; Moore and Small 2008), participants who 
were assigned to the similarity condition were asked to write down “Three ways in which you 
are similar compared to the average undergraduate student at <school name>.” On the other 
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hand, participants who were in the control condition were not given this task. The procedures 
regarding the selling and buying price elicitation and average estimation were identical to those 
in study 1A.   
A pre-test with participants from the same subject population was conducted to 
investigate whether the similarity priming was successful. Consistent with Menon et al. (2009), 
all the participants in the pre-test rated the extent to which they saw themselves similar to the 
average undergraduate student on a seven-point scale anchored at “Not at all” and “Very much”. 
The results revealed that the self and the average undergraduate student were perceived as more 
similar in the similarity priming condition than the control condition (Msimilarity = 4.89 vs. Mcontrol 
= 4.27, t(70) = 1.83, p < .05), indicating that the similarity manipulation worked as intended.   
 
4.4.2     Results 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Actual and Estimated Average Reservation Prices  
 
CONDITION 
ACTUAL 
(1) 
ESTIMATED 
(2) 
DIFFERENCE*† 
(2) – (1) 
OWNER 
CONTROL 
(n=17) $6.57 
$4.44 -$2.13 (t = -5.48, p < .01) 
OWNER 
SIMILARITY 
(n=18) 
$5.69 -$0.88 (t = -1.81, p < .05) 
BUYER 
CONTROL 
(n=24) $4.06 
$4.58   $0.52 (t = 1.74, p < .05) 
BUYER 
SIMILARITY 
(n=23) 
$3.74 -$0.32 (t = -0.99, ns) 
     *one-tailed test is used to test these predictions.  
     †For both owners and buyers, the difference in the estimation errors between the similarity condition  
and control condition is significant, ps < .05.  
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As reported in Table 4.3, owners’ average lowest selling price (Mowners-actual = $6.57) is 
again significantly higher than buyers’ average highest purchase price (M buyers-actual = $4.06), 
t(80) = 5.00,  p < .01. In addition, owners in the control condition underestimate the average 
selling price stated by other owners (Mowners-estimated = $4.44). The average prediction error is  
-$2.13, t(16) = -5.48, p < .01. Importantly, owners in the similarity condition underestimate the 
actual average selling price by only -$0.88 (t(17) = -1.81, p < .05), which corresponds to a 59% 
decrease in the prediction error. The difference in the prediction errors between the similarity 
prime and control conditions is statistically significant (t(33) = 2.01, p < .05).  
Buyers in the control condition overestimate the average buying price stated by other 
buyers (Mbuyers-estimated = $4.58). The average overestimation is $0.52, t(23) = 1.74, p < .05. 
However, as predicted, similarity priming eliminated buyers’ overestimation. The average 
prediction error in the similarity condition is -$0.32, t(22) = -0.99, ns. Thus, as we argue, priming 
similarity to other participants attenuates the prediction bias.  
 Additionally, similar to study 1A, we compare the estimated market valuation of both 
groups to see whether the similarity priming helped participants predict the endowment effect. 
For the group of participants primed with similarity, the results reveal that the average estimated 
market valuation of owners (Mowners-estimated = $5.69) is significantly higher than that of buyers (M 
buyers-estimated = $3.74), t(39) = 3.59, p < .01. This suggests that when estimating others’ valuations, 
these participants anticipate the endowment effect, supporting H2. However, replicating the 
finding of study 1A, participants in the control condition fail to predict the endowment effect (M 
owners-estimated = $4.44 vs. M buyers-estimated = $4.58, t(39) = -0.25, ns). Consistent with these results, 
the index of anticipation of the endowment effect is 0.78 and 0 (i.e., the negative value is 
truncated at 0) for the similarity condition and control condition, respectively. This result 
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suggests that perceived similarity significantly enhances the participants’ perspective taking in 
the context of endowment. That is, while the participants in the control condition underestimate 
the true impact of the endowment effect by 100%, the underestimation is reduced to 22% when 
they are primed with similarity.   
  Finally, we investigated whether owners and buyers have a general tendency to make 
biased predictions about the values of objects. After all the participants completed and returned 
their surveys (but before the randomly selected price was announced), we asked them to provide 
their best guess for the actual selling price of the mug at the bookstore ($6.95). Again, they were 
offered a $2 reward if their estimation was within $0.50 of the actual selling price of the mug. 
The results reveal that neither owners nor buyers in the control condition estimate the actual 
price with significant error, though their estimations are above the actual price. The average 
prediction error (i.e., estimated price minus actual price) for owners and buyers is $0.64 (t(16) = 
0.81, ns) and $1.15 (t(23) = 1.26, ns), respectively.21
 
 Also, there is no difference in the prediction 
errors between the two groups. These results suggest that although both owners and buyers in the 
control condition tend to be fairly accurate while predicting the actual price of the mug, they fail 
to predict valuations of others in the same role.  
4.4.3     Discussion  
 
 
Overall, study 2 reveals that increased perceived similarity between the self and the target people 
eliminates the bias in buyers’ prediction of valuation of other buyers and significantly reduces 
the bias in owners’ prediction of other owners’ valuation. Although these results provide initial 
support for our argument that reduction in the self-other gap enables consumers to more 
                                                 
21 The results are similar for the similarity priming condition. The average prediction error for owners and buyers is 
$0.88 (t(17) = 1.63, ns) and $0.02 (t(22) = 0.04, ns), respectively. 
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accurately predict valuations of others in the same role, it does not directly test the role of 
perspective taking and empathy in the observed effects. Thus, in the next study, we perform a 
test of the underlying mechanism for our results by examining the impact of individual 
differences in perspective taking and empathy on owners’ and buyers’ estimation errors.  
 We argue that if the prediction errors of owners and buyers are due to the inability of the 
average participant to emotionally connect with other participants and properly step into their 
shoes, we should observe that participants’ estimation errors covary with their empathic ability 
and perspective taking tendency. Following previous research (e.g., Galinsky et al. 2008; Parker 
and Axtell 2001; Oswald 1996), we distinguish between perspective taking and empathy, which 
are two related but distinct social competencies. As defined by Galinsky et al. (2008, p.378), 
perspective taking refers to “the cognitive capacity to consider the world from another 
individual’s view point”, whereas empathy refers to “the ability to connect emotionally with 
another individual.” Relatedly, it has been documented that perspective taking results in greater 
overlap between mental representations of the self and those of others (Davis et al. 1996; 
Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000). Thus, perspective taking ability enables individuals to anticipate 
the behavior and reactions of others (Davis 1983), whereas empathy is an other-focused 
emotional reaction, which allows individuals to establish affective connections with others 
(Galinsky et al. 2008).  
 We maintain that these distinct abilities interact to influence the accuracy of people’s 
predictions of others’ valuations. This is because valuation is a process that involves both 
calculation and feeling (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004) and thus, accurately predicting the 
valuations of others in the same role requires individuals to connect with others on both a 
cognitive and emotional level. In other words, simply having the capacity to take others’ 
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perspective is not sufficient to enhance prediction accuracy; it is also important to be able to 
anticipate others’ feelings. Our argument is also supported by previous research suggesting that 
perspective taking skills or attempts may not always enable individuals to accurately identify 
others’ mental states (e.g., Galinsky, Ku, and Wang 2005; Epley and Caruso 2009; Eyal and 
Epley 2010). For instance, Galinsky et al. (2005, p.120) point out: “Perspective-taking that lacks 
deep deliberation, however, can actually be costly to the self and others…pallid perspective-
taking might increase pluralistic ignorance.” Similarly, Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman (2006, p. 
886) emphasize: “the impact of perspective taking on behavior among individuals or within 
groups depends critically on what people see when they look into the minds of others.” 
Accordingly, we argue that higher level of perspective taking ability enhances the prediction 
accuracy of those who are high, but not low, in empathy, which enables them to emotionally 
connect with others in the process of perspective taking. Formally: 
H3: Perspective taking will be associated with lower estimation errors in predicting the 
valuation of others in the same role when owners and buyers are high, but not low, 
in empathy.  
 
 
 
 
4.5     STUDY 3 
 
 
4.5.1     Method 
 
Sixty two undergraduate students registered for an introductory level marketing course at a large 
mid-Atlantic university participated in the study to receive course credit. Students were 
randomly assigned to the owner (n = 31) or buyer (n = 31) condition. Participants reported to the 
lab, where each session was run separately. The procedures regarding the selling and buying 
price elicitation and average estimation were identical to those in study 1A. Participants’ 
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perspective taking ability was measured using a four-item, 7-point scale (α = 0.65) adapted from 
Davis (1983). Examples of the items included in the scale are the statements “I believe that there 
are two sides to every question and try to look at them both” and “I sometimes try to understand 
my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.” We also measured 
participants’ empathy using a four-item, 7-point scale (α = 0.71) adapted from Davis (1983). To 
illustrate, the following items are included in the scale: “I would describe myself as a pretty soft-
hearted person” and “Sometimes I don’t feel sorry for other people when they are having 
problems” (reversed).22
 
 
4.5.2     Results 
 
 
Owners’ and buyers’ valuations again demonstrated an endowment effect. Owners’ average 
lowest selling price (Mowners-actual = $5.22) is significantly higher than buyers’ average highest 
purchase price (Mbuyers-actual = $2.48), t(60) = 5.48, p < .01. Replicating our previous finding, 
owners underestimate the average selling price stated by other owners (Mowners-estimated = $4.06). 
The average prediction error is -$1.16, t(30) = -4.71, p < .01. On the other hand, buyers 
overestimate the average buying price stated by other buyers (Mbuyers-estimated = $3.31). The 
average overestimation is $0.83, t(30) = 3.25, p < .01. Accordingly, the index of anticipation of 
the endowment effect is 0.27, suggesting that the participants underestimate the true impact of 
the endowment effect on preferences of others in the same role by 73%.   
                                                 
22 We find a positive and modest correlation between perspective taking and empathy scores (ρ = 0.318, p < .01), 
consistent with previous research documenting that the scales are measuring distinct but related constructs (e.g., 
Davis 1996; Galinsky et al. 2008; Gleason, Jensen-Campbell, and Ickes 2009). As pointed out by Gleason et al. 
(2009, p. 999), “it is possible that a person could be relatively good at seeing another person’s point of view while 
being relatively poor at inferring the specific content of the other person’s moment-to-moment thoughts and feelings 
(or vice versa).”   
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 To test H3, we conducted separate regression analyses for owners and buyers with 
participants’ estimation errors as the dependent variable and the independent variables of 
perspective taking score and empathy score and their interaction. As suggested by Aiken and 
West (1991), both perspective taking and empathy scores are mean centered to reduce 
multicollinearity (all VIFs are below 1.5). The results for owners and buyers are presented in 
Table 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.   
 
 
Table 4.4: Regression of Owners’ Estimation Errors on Perspective Taking, Empathy, and Their 
Interaction  
 
 
 DV = Underestimation 
 Parameter Estimate t-value VIF 
Constant     -1.443** -5.48  
Perspective taking (P)  0.326  0.93 1.330 
Empathy (E) -0.088 -0.28 1.487 
P x E    0.809*  2.29 1.181 
    
Observations 31   
R-squared 19.58%   
                    ** p < .01, * p < .05, one-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 As predicted, there is a positive and significant interaction between owners’ chronic level 
of perspective taking and empathy (β = 0.809, t(30) = 2.29, p <. 05), whereas both main effects 
are insignificant. To facilitate the interpretation of the two-way interaction, we follow the post-
hoc probing procedure recommended by Aiken and West (1991).  We first calculate high (low) 
values for perspective taking and empathy by adding (subtracting) the standard deviation to 
(from) the mean. We then conduct simple slope analysis. The results suggest that higher level of 
perspective taking ability is associated with lower estimation errors (i.e., less underestimation of 
the average selling price of other owners) when participants are also high in empathy (MHigh-
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PT/High-E = -$0.67 vs. MLow-PT/High-E = -$2.35, t(30) = 2.20, p < .05). However, greater perspective 
taking is not associated with more accurate predictions when participants are low in empathy 
(MHigh-PT/Low-E = -$1.71 vs. MLow-PT/Low-E = -$1.04, t(30) = -0.91, ns). 
 
 
Table 4.5: Regression of Buyers’ Estimation Errors on Perspective Taking, Empathy, and Their 
Interaction  
 
 
 DV = Overestimation 
 Parameter Estimate t-value VIF 
Constant      1.074**  4.20  
Perspective taking (P)   -0.517* -1.93 1.344 
Empathy (E) -0.029 -0.12 1.316 
P x E   -0.471* -2.30 1.025 
    
Observations 31   
R-squared 25.30%   
                    ** p < .01, * p < .05, one-tailed test. 
 
 
  
In the case of buyers, consistent with our prediction, we find a negative and significant 
interaction between perspective taking ability and empathy (β = -0.471, t(30) = 2.30, p <. 05). 
There is also a negative main effect for perspective taking (β = -0.517, t(30) = 1.93, p < .05), 
whereas the estimated coefficient on empathy is not significant. Post-hoc probing of the 
interaction reveals that higher level of perspective taking ability is associated with more accurate 
predictions (i.e., lower overestimation of the average buying price stated by other buyers) when 
participants are high in empathy (MHigh-PT/High-E = $0.00 vs. MLow-PT/High-E = $2.09, t(30) = 2.75, p 
< .01). However, this effect is not observed among participants with low empathy (MHigh-PT/Low-E 
= $1.09 vs. MLow-PT/Low-E = $1.12, t = -0.04, ns).  
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4.5.3     Discussion  
 
Study 3 demonstrates that the magnitude of the bias in owners’ and buyers’ predictions of 
valuations of others in the same role covary with their perspective taking and empathy. We 
document that greater perspective taking tendency is associated with more accurate predictions 
when participants are high in empathic ability, providing support for the proposed underlying 
mechanism for our effects (i.e., self-other difference in valuation arising from intrarole empathy 
gaps). However, the results also reveal that perspective taking may not always be fruitful. In 
particular, among participants with low empathic ability, perspective taking is not associated 
with lower prediction errors. Overall, the results suggest that the success of a perspective taking 
attempt in the context of endowment depends on one’s ability to connect emotionally with 
others. One limitation of this study, however, is that participants’ perspective taking tendency 
was measured. To address this limitation and provide a stronger and cleaner test of our 
hypothesis, we manipulate perspective taking in Study 4.  
 
 
4.6     STUDY 4 
 
 
4.6.1     Method 
 
 
A 2 (owners vs. buyers) x 2 (priming perspective taking vs. control) between-subjects 
experimental design was employed. One hundred forty five undergraduate students registered for 
an introductory level marketing course at a large mid-Atlantic university participated in the study 
in exchange for course credit. There were seventy two students in the “owner” session and 
seventy three students in the “buyer” session. They reported to the lab, where sessions were run 
separately. Participants were randomly assigned to either the perspective taking or the control 
condition. The procedures regarding the selling and buying price elicitation and average 
estimation were identical to those in study 1A.  
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 We manipulated perspective taking using a task adapted from Galinsky and Moskowitz 
(2000). In particular, participants in the perspective taking condition were asked to construct a 
narrative essay about how they think a typical student at the same university spends a day. The 
following instructions were provided to the participants:  
Now, we are interested in what you think of other <university name> students. Please 
imagine a day in the life of a typical <university name> student, looking at the world 
through this person’s eyes. And, in the space below, describe how you think the typical 
<university name> student spends a day, including activities, thoughts, etc.  
 
 Participants in the control condition were asked to write an essay about how they spent 
their day yesterday, including events, activities, etc. Prior to each task, we measured participants’ 
empathy using the same four-item, 7-point scale (α = 0.64) employed in Study 3.  
 
4.6.2     Results  
 
 
An endowment effect is again observed in owners’ and buyers’ valuations (Mowners-actual = $5.14 
vs. Mbuyers-actual = $3.39, t(143) = 4.25, p < .01). Also, consistent with our previous studies, 
owners in the control condition underestimated other owners’ average selling price (Mowners-
estimated = $3.87 vs. Mowners-actual = $5.14, t(34) = -5.53 , p < .01), whereas buyers in the control 
condition overestimated other buyers’ average purchase price (Mbuyers-estimated = $4.09 vs. Mbuyers-
actual = $3.39, t(36) = 3.22 , p < .01).  
 We test our prediction that the perspective taking manipulation attenuates participants’ 
estimation errors only when they are high in empathic ability by conducting separate regression 
analyses for both groups. The dependent variable in each regression is the estimation error and 
the independent variables are perspective taking prime, empathy score (mean-centered), and their 
interaction. Table 4.6 and 4.7 present the regression results for owners and buyers, respectively.  
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Table 4.6:  Regression of Owners’ Estimation Errors on Perspective Taking Prime, Empathy, and 
Their Interaction 
 
 
 DV = Underestimation 
 Parameter Estimate t-value VIF 
Constant   -1.095** -5.98  
Perspective taking (P) 0.170  0.93 1.002 
Empathy (E) 0.225  1.18 1.033 
P x E   0.384*  2.02 1.032 
    
Observations 72   
R-squared 7.59%   
                    ** p < .01, * p < .05, one-tailed test.  
 
 
 
 As expected, we find a positive and significant interaction between perspective taking 
and empathic ability (β = 0.384, t(71) = 2.02, p <. 05). No other effects are significant. 
Consistent with our thesis, post-hoc analysis reveals that participants in the perspective taking 
condition make more accurate predictions when they are high in empathy (MPT/High-E = -$0.32 vs. 
MControl/High-E = -$1.42, t(71) = 2.09, p < .05). However, the same effect is not observed among 
those who are low in empathy (MPT/Low-E = -$1.53 vs. MControl/Low-E = -$1.11, t(71) = -0.80, ns).  
 
 
Table 4.7:  Regression of Buyers’ Estimation Errors on Perspective Taking Prime, Empathy, and 
Their Interaction 
 
 
 DV = Overestimation 
 Parameter Estimate t-value VIF 
Constant       0.547**  3.12  
Perspective taking (P)   -0.163* -0.93 1.000 
Empathy (E) -0.152 -0.77 1.004 
P x E   -0.387* -1.97 1.004 
    
Observations 73   
R-squared 7.44%   
                     ** p < .01, * p < .05, one-tailed test. 
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 The regression results for buyers are also consistent with our prediction. There is a 
negative and significant interaction between the perspective taking prime and empathic ability (β 
= -0.387, t(72) = -1.97, p <. 05). Specifically, while the perspective taking manipulation reduces 
participants’ estimation errors when they are high in empathy (MPT/High-E= -$0.12 vs. MControl/High-E 
= $0.91, t(72) = -2.06, p < .05) , it does not result in more accurate estimates among those 
participants with low empathy (MPT/Low-E = $0.88 vs. MControl/Low-E = $0.51, t(72) = 0.75, ns).  
 
4.6.3     Discussion  
 
 
This study provides further evidence on the proposed underlying mechanism by manipulating 
perspective taking and documenting that perspective taking helps participants more accurately 
predict others’ valuations only when they are high in empathic ability. However, trying to 
connect with others at the cognitive level does not bring about benefits in terms of prediction 
accuracy when participants are low in empathy.  
 
 
4.7     GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Perspective taking influences consumers’ attitudes and decisions. However, perspective taking 
even among those who are in the same psychological state is impaired by individuals’ tendency 
to underestimate the extent to which affective experiences impact others’ preferences. In other 
words, empathy gaps in emotional perspective taking persist among individuals assigned to the 
same role. Relatedly, in the context of the endowment, we document that even being in the shoes 
of others (e.g., being an owner and estimating the valuation of other owners) does not enable 
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individuals to accurately predict the valuations of others in the same role. We attribute this to the 
notion of a self-other difference in valuation arising from intrarole empathy gaps.  
 Specifically, we find that the average asking price set by owners for their own mugs is 
significantly higher than the price at which they believe other owners would be willing to sell 
their mugs. Conversely, the average price offered by buyers for the mug is less than the amount 
which they believe other buyers would be willing to give up for the same mug. That is, owners 
underestimate the average selling price stated by other owners, whereas buyers overestimate the 
average buying price stated by other buyers. However, consistent with our thesis built on the 
self-other gap in valuation, in study 2 we find that priming similarities between the self and the 
target reduces the magnitude of owners’ underestimation by nearly 60% and eliminates buyers’ 
overestimation. Finally, using both an individual difference measure (study 3) and experimental 
manipulation (study 4), we find that perspective taking decreases owners’ and buyers’ estimation 
errors when they are high, but not low, in empathic ability, providing additional support for the 
proposed underlying mechanism. 
The documented bias in owners’ and buyers’ predictions of the valuation of others in the 
same role can have important economic implications. For instance, when demand for homes is 
high in an area, buyers may feel like they are elbow to elbow with other potential buyers.  As a 
result, overestimating the price that other buyers are willing to pay for a particular home may 
cause a buyer to place a very high bid, resulting in a more costly transaction. Further, Novemsky 
and Schweitzer (2004) find that the price paid by other buyers in a similar situation plays an 
important role in determining a buyer’s satisfaction with a particular transaction. Therefore, in 
addition to bearing the economic cost of overestimation of other buyers’ purchase prices, buyers 
will suffer from reduced satisfaction with a transaction when they discover that other buyers are 
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actually willing to pay less (or already paid less) for the same or similar object as compared to 
their estimation.  
 In addition to being buyers, consumers also act as sellers when selling used items. In fact, 
recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase in the amount of selling by consumers as online 
trading channels (e.g., eBay, Overstock.com) have become more accessible. However, price 
setting for used items is not a simple process. As opposed to most brand new items that are 
traded in transparent markets at fixed market clearing prices, used items―especially those that 
have sentimental value to their owners― are traded at prices determined by both economic and 
psychological parameters. The price for the item should be low enough to attract potential 
customers, but it should not be so low that the seller cannot justify the transaction both 
economically and psychologically. The psychological aspect of price setting involves thinking 
about how much another seller would ask to sell the same or similar item. In fact, Novemsky and 
Schweitzer (2004) document that social comparison judgments are the most reliable predictor of 
satisfaction with a transaction for sellers as well. Therefore, underestimating the selling prices of 
other owners may lead an owner to sell an item at a lower price, reducing not only the economic 
benefit of the sale but also decreasing the overall satisfaction of the seller with the transaction. 
 Our findings extend previous research examining the role of interrole (i.e., non-owners 
vs. owners) empathy gaps in the context of endowment (Loewenstein and Adler 1995; Van 
Boven et al. 2000). We document that people fail to accurately predict others’ valuations of an 
object even in the absence of interrole empathy gaps. From a conceptual point of view, our 
research focuses on a previously unexamined dimension of perspective taking among owners and 
buyers― biases in their intrarole comparative valuation judgments (i.e., owners vs. owners and 
buyers vs. buyers) and thereby, complements and extends the work by Van Boven et al. (2000).  
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 Furthermore, we document practical implications of the self-other difference in the value 
function, extending the work of Faro and Rottentstreich (2006) who demonstrate the implications 
of self-other differences in the probability weighting function. At first glance, documented 
evidence on self-other differences in key aspects of prospect theory may seem inconsistent with 
the large body of evidence on “perceived consensus”— people’s tendency to overestimate the 
degree to which others are like themselves (e.g., Hoch 1987; Marks and Miller 1987; Dawes 
1989). However, previous research (e.g., McFarland and Miller 1990; Monin and Norton 2003; 
Van Boven et al. 2005) suggests that perceived consensus and uniqueness bias can coexist in 
various settings. Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) argue that when predicting others’ decisions in a 
particular situation, people may correctly think that the type of feelings they experience will also 
be experienced by others (perceived consensus) but incorrectly anticipate that others will 
experience these feelings to a lesser extent (uniqueness bias). The prediction errors we 
documented in our endowment effect studies seem to be driven by this sort of misunderstanding.   
 We also contribute to the literature on social predictions by documenting that perspective 
taking and empathic ability interact to influence people’s predictions of others’ reactions to 
endowment and lack of ownership. Although previous research suggests that perspective taking 
and empathy are two related but distinct social competencies, to the best of our knowledge, our 
study is the first to document that the success of a perspective taking attempt depends on one’s 
level of empathic ability. In particular, trying to see things from others’ point of view may be a 
futile exercise unless someone has the capacity to emotionally connect with others.        
 Future research should explore personal and situational factors that could potentially 
affect the magnitude of the bias exhibited by individuals while predicting the valuations of others 
in the same role. For instance, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) propose that the probability 
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weighting function is more S-shaped for risky decisions with affect-rich outcomes than those 
with affect-poor outcomes. In parallel, the magnitude of the self-other difference in the value 
function may depend on whether an object is affect-rich or affect poor (e.g., personalized 
products vs. commodities). Previous literature (e.g., Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004) suggests that 
while consumers tend to evaluate affect-rich products based on the feelings they evoke, their 
evaluations of affect-poor products are generally based on objective criteria. Thus, the magnitude 
of the estimation error may be lower when owners and buyers are asked to estimate how valuable 
a relatively affect-poor object to others in the same role. Further, in our studies (and in most of 
the previous endowment effect studies), owners sold their possessions to the experimenter and 
thus, there is no competition among owners who are willing to sell their possessions. Similarly, 
buyers also do not compete with each other to acquire the object since the experimenter provided 
enough supply to meet potential demand. Future research should examine sellers’ and buyers’ 
decisions in an auction setting where their mispredictions of valuations of others in the same role 
may have a significant impact on the prices at which they offer to sell or buy an object.  
Interactions with other consumers play a significant role in determining parameters of our 
economic transactions and the satisfaction that we obtain from these transactions. Thus, 
enhanced understanding of the perspective of others in the same role can help consumers avoid 
suboptimal economic decisions. This research contributes to our understanding of consumers’ 
perspective taking by demonstrating that in the context of endowment, consumers fail to take an 
accurate perspective of others even when they are in the same shoes and that perspective taking 
can be enhanced by helping individuals appreciate similarities between themselves and others in 
the same role.  
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5.0       CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
My dissertation builds on and extends the literature examining how consumers’ decisions are 
influenced by their interactions with those around them. In particular, I focused on three different 
social aspects of consumer behavior: social presence, social power, and social prediction. And, I 
explored the link between each of these social forces and consumers’ monetary decisions. Each 
essay addresses an issue that either stems from the difference in individuals’ focus on the self 
versus others (Essays 1 and 2) or is a manifestation of the self-other difference (Essay 3).  
 I use the agency-communion theory (Bakan 1966) as basis for my first essay’s conceptual 
framework and find that agentic individuals, who are self-focused and strive for status, engage in 
self-promotion through increased spending in the presence of their friends as compared to when 
they shop alone. In contrast, communal individuals, who are other-focused and place emphasis 
on social relations, adopt a modest self-presentation and keep their spending under control while 
shopping with their friends. Agency and communion also serve as the building blocks of the 
theoretical framework of my second essay, which documents that having versus lacking power 
over others increases financial risk taking among agentic individuals, who associate power with 
self-interest goals aimed at enhancing one’s  own wealth and status. However, this effect is not 
observed among communal individuals, who strive for cooperation and harmony rather than 
promote their self-interests. Finally, my third essay demonstrates the self-other difference in 
consumers’ valuation of objects due to empathy gaps. In particular, buyers believe that other 
buyers would be willing pay more than themselves to acquire an object, while sellers believe that 
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other owners would ask a lower price than themselves to part with the object. These three essays 
together significantly advance our current understanding of the role of social influence in 
consumer behavior. But, naturally the findings of each essay give rise to new questions and 
research opportunities. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss the theoretical implications 
along with the limitations of my research and suggest several potential avenues for future 
research.            
 One aspect of social influence I have not studied in my dissertation is decision making in 
a group setting. Previous research examining group members’ sequential choices provides 
evidence consistent with a dynamic decision process where individuals shift their choices based 
on prior selections of other group members, even at the expense of selecting non-favorite items 
(e.g., Ariely and Levav 2000; Quester and Steyer 2010). Agency and communion can provide a 
rich framework for future research aimed at extending this stream of literature. Bakan (1966, 
p.15) argues: “agency manifests itself in the formation of separations; communion in the lack of 
separations”. Thus, in the context of group decision making, one would expect a systematic 
difference between agentic and communal individuals’ choices such that agentic individuals 
diverge from the previous choices of others, while communal individuals converge to the group’s 
most popular choice. However, one also needs to consider that agency involves putting pleasures 
of the self at the center stage. Therefore, deviating from others’ choices at the cost of personal 
consumption satisfaction can create a tension between agentic individuals’ eagerness to 
differentiate themselves from others and desire to please the self. Shared experiences (e.g., 
Raghunathan and Corfman 2006; Ramanathan and McGill 2007; Fisher et al. 2011) also provide 
an interesting setting within which to examine how individuals’ self versus other orientation 
104 
 
impacts the choices they make with others and the level of satisfaction they derive from these 
choices.  
 Another interesting question for future research is how individuals’ risk seeking tendency 
in the domain of financial decision making changes when they make decisions in a group setting 
versus alone. And, does agency-communion orientation play a moderating role in this process? 
One plausible argument is that prior risky choices of other members induce greater financial risk 
taking among both agentic and communal individuals but this effect is more pronounced for the 
first group. That is, agentic individuals’ desire to get ahead of others is expected to lead them to 
make riskier financial decisions than other members, while communal individuals’ tendency to 
get along with others causes them to exhibit a risk seeking behavior comparable to that of other 
members.       
 Social influence does not necessarily entail face-to-face interaction. As more and more 
people began using social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter during the last few 
years, the influence of peers in consumer decision making has gained more importance. 
Individuals now share information with their friends more commonly in the form of digital 
content. They write messages and blogs about their experiences and share photos and videos. 
Hence, similar to the physical presence of friends, the participation in social networking sites 
may fuel individuals’ impression management concerns. One fruitful avenue for future research 
is to investigate the differences in the uses of social media in a self-enhancing manner between 
agentic and communal individuals. In particular, it would be interesting to examine whether 
agentic individuals’ tendency to self-promote themselves in the social media impacts their 
spending decisions (e.g., going on an expensive trip, buying a new car, dining at a fancy 
restaurant, etc.). If so, the extensive use of online social networks coupled with a desire to get 
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ahead of others and present the self at the best possible light may have delirious effects on 
agentic consumers’ welfare and well-being.  
 Another direction for future research involves the study of differences in the volume and 
type of digital content generated by agentic and communal individuals in social networking 
websites. Previous research suggests that although people are increasingly using social 
networking channels, they differ widely in terms of volume, type, and quality of the digital 
content they generate and consume (Trusov, Bodapati, and Bucklin 2010). For instance, while 
agentic individuals are predicted to share experiences that highlight their individuality and 
superiority, communal individuals’ posts are expected to reflect their emotional expressivity and 
warmth. This tendency may in turn affect the traffic and attention their profiles attract, 
determining the success of their self-presentation efforts.        
 Participation in online social networks can also alter people’s sense of connectedness to 
others and perceived support they receive from them. A recent study by Zhu et al. (2012) 
document that online community members are willing to take greater financial risk than those 
who do not participate in an online community. The authors explain this finding with the 
“cushion hypothesis”, which posits that individuals are more likely to make risky financial 
decisions when they feel they are cushioned by their peers and family members in the event of a 
potential financial difficulty (Weber and Hsee 1998). One would expect that this effect is more 
prevalent among communal individuals, who place emphasis on social relationships and 
connections with others. On the other hand, agentic individuals are expected to rely less on the 
perceived support received from others when making risky financial choices. Future research 
should explore this possibility.     
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 In addition to peers, salespeople have been shown to be an important source of social 
influence in the marketplace (e.g., Evans 1963; Davis and Silk 1972; Woodside and Davenport 
1974). Previous research has examined how various consumer and salespeople characteristics 
impact the outcome of different persuasion and selling tactics (e.g., Richins 1983; Sujan, 
Bettman, and Sujan 1986; Friestad and Wright 1994; Campbell and Kirmani 2000). Evans 
(1963) was among the first to point out that a customer’s purchase decision in part depends on 
whether s/he considers salesperson a friend. Others have also characterized a good salesperson as 
friendly (e.g., Mayer and Greenberg 1964; Rafaeli and Sutton 1987). Nonetheless, there has not 
been a systematic examination of “friendly” influence tactics of salespeople on consumers’ 
spending decisions. In particular, future research should look into whether a friendly salesperson 
generates an impact similar to the presence of friends in a shopping trip on agentic and 
communal consumers’ spending behavior. However, it is important to note that while agentic 
individuals are expected to alter their spending behavior to highlight their status vis-à-vis those 
around them, they may be less likely to establish friendly relations with salespeople due to their 
independent and self-reliant nature. Furthermore, while prior research has examined the 
economic implications of empathy gaps between buyers and owners (e.g., Van Boven et al. 
2000), the presence and consequences of empathy gaps between buyers and salespeople have not 
received much attention. Future research could also address this issue.  
 Consumer decision making is not an isolated process but rather shaped through 
individuals’ interactions with others. As the above discussion suggests, social influence research 
in consumer behavior can be advanced by paying close attention to the role of individuals’ self 
versus other orientation in determining the impact of various social forces on their preferences 
and choices. In particular, the agency-communion theory provides a plausible framework for 
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future research. Empathy gaps among social actors in the marketplace are also topic of interest 
for further studies. Building on my essays and different streams of literature on social influence, 
I proposed several research opportunities for examining the interplay between internal and 
external factors in the context of consumer choice. As I demonstrated in my dissertation, social 
impact in various forms can significantly alter consumers’ welfare and well-being. However, 
there are more related issues yet to be explored.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Table A1. Sample Statistics for the Pilot Study (Essay 1) 
   
  Frequency Percent  
Relationship Type      
Friend 72 5.96 
Spouse 138 11.42 
Parent 42 3.48 
Child 298 24.67 
Someone else’s child 48 3.97 
Adult family member 48 3.97 
Someone else 19 1.57 
Unknown relationship 156 12.91 
   
Male and w/Friend 16 1.32 
Female and w/Friend 56 4.64 
   
Others 653 54.06 
Alone 555 45.94 
   
Sex   
Male 265 21.94 
Female 943 78.06 
   
Payment Method   
Cash 723 59.85 
Check 267 22.10 
Credit 218 18.05 
   
Number of Accompanying People  
1 person 423 35.02 
2 person 165 13.66 
3 person 54 4.47 
4 person 10 0.83 
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Table A2. Mean Actual Spending by Condition for the Pilot Study (Essay 1) 
 
 
 Alone w/ Friend 
Male $32.04 
(n=131) 
$47.84 
(n=16) 
Female $39.31 
(n=424) 
$38.42 
(n=56) 
 
 
 
REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE PILOT STUDY (ESSAY 1) 
 
ln(AMOUNTSPENT) =  β0 + β1*ln(PLANNED) + β2*FRIEND  +β3-9*OTHERS + β10*TIME  
+ β11*ln(INCOME) + β12*CREDIT + β13*CHECK + β14*INSPECIAL + β15*GENDER  
+ β16*AGE + β17*NUMBER + β18*FRIEND x GENDER + β19-25* OTHERS x GENDER + ε1 
 
where, 
 
AMOUNTSPENT = dollar amount spent by the respondent in the store. (Because of the 
skewness of the data, logarithmic transformation is used.) 
PLANNED = dollar amount that the respondent planned to spend on that shopping trip. (Because 
of the skewness of the data, logarithmic transformation is used.) 
FRIEND = 1 if accompanied by a friend, -1 if not accompanied by a friend.  
OTHERS = dummy variables for other social influence categories: spouse, child, someone else’s 
child, parent, adult family member, someone else, and unknown (e.g., SPOUSE = 1 if 
accompanied by spouse, -1 if not accompanied by spouse).  
TIME = minutes elapsed between the time respondent entered the store and completed paying. 
INCOME = total annual income of respondent’s family. Respondents answered this question by 
selecting one of the eight categories (< $15,000; $15,000 < $25,000; $25,000 < $35,000; $35,000 
< $45,000; $45,000 < $55,000; $55,000 < $75,000; $75,000 < $100,000; $100,000+). We 
created a continuous income variable by taking the median income for each category. 
CREDIT = 1 if paid with a credit card, -1 otherwise. 
CHECK = 1 if paid with a check, -1 otherwise. 
INSPECIAL = 1 if took advantage of an in-store special, -1 otherwise. 
GENDER = 1 if male and -1 if female.  
110 
 
AGE = age of the shopper. Respondents were provided with seven categories (under 18; 18-24; 
25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64; 65+). A continuous age variable was created by taking the median 
age for each category. 
NUMBER = number of accompaniers.  
 
 
 
Table A3. Regression Results for the Pilot Study (Essay 1) 
 
 
  Equation: ln(amount spent) 
  Parameter Estimate t-value 
Intercept  0.30 0.62 
ln(planned amount)      0.73** 23.99 
Friend    0.12* 2.02 
Spouse  0.06 1.35 
Parent             -0.04 -0.36 
Child  0.04 0.85 
Someone else’s child  0.01 0.05 
Adult family member  0.08 0.98 
Someone else  0.03 0.33 
Unknown relationship  0.09 1.83 
Time spent in the store     0.01** 7.07 
ln(income)     0.08** 2.70 
Credit     0.20** 7.25 
Check     0.20** 7.82 
In-store special    0.05* 2.18 
Gender  0.25 1.41 
Age  -0.001 -0.97 
Number 0.02 0.32 
Friend x Gender     0.15** 2.88 
Spouse x Gender 0.02 0.52 
Parent x Gender -0.05 -0.45 
Child x Gender 0.02 0.70 
Someone else’s child x Gender -0.05 -0.62 
Adult family member x Gender 0.07 0.97 
Someone else x Gender 0.12 1.38 
Unknown rel. x Gender 0.04 1.12 
*p<.05  **p<.01                                          R2 =48.9%   
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
Table B1. Brand Selection Frequency in Study 1 (Essay 1) 
 
 
 Male Shoppers Female Shoppers 
Brand 
Selection* Alone 
w/ Male 
Friend 
w/ Female 
Friend Alone 
w/ Male 
Friend 
w/ Female 
Friend 
Expensive 26.09% 90.91% 77.78% 37.50% 15.38% 28.57% 
Moderate 39.13% 9.09% 22.22% 20.83% 69.23% 71.43% 
Cheap 34.78% 0% 0% 41.67% 15.38% 0% 
n 23 11 9 24 13 7 
* Expensive = Energizer/Duracell; Moderate = Rayovac/Panasonic, Cheap = Chateau  
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Female 
 
                                                                             * Expensive = Energizer/Duracell; Moderate = Rayovac/Panasonic, Cheap = Chateau 
 
Male 
 
* Expensive = Energizer/Duracell; Moderate = Rayovac/Panasonic, Cheap = Chateau 
 
 
Figure B1. Percentage of Different Types of Brands Purchased in Study 1 (Essay 1) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 
REGRESSION MODEL FOR STUDY 2 (ESSAY 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
ln(AMOUNTSPENT) =  δ0 + δ1*ln(PLANNED) + δ2*FRIEND  + δ3*TIME + δ4*ln(INCOME)  
+ δ5*CREDIT + δ6*MIX + δ7*AGE + δ8* GENDER + δ9*INSPECIAL + δ10*VISIT  
+ δ11*ACDIF + δ12* IMPULSE + δ13* SM + δ14*FRIEND x ACDIF + δ15*FRIEND x SM + 
δ16*ACDIF x SM + δ17*FRIEND x ACDIF x SM + ε2 
 
where, 
AMOUNTSPENT = amount spent by the respondent in the mall. (Because of the skewness of 
the data, logarithmic transformation is used.) 
PLANNED = amount that the respondent was planning to spend on that shopping trip as 
indicated by the respondent in the entrance interview.  
FRIEND = 1 if accompanied by a friend, -1 otherwise. 
ACDIF = difference between a respondent’s agency and communion scores (ACDIF = Agency – 
Communion; positive values = a higher agency orientation, negative values = a higher 
communion orientation). 
SM = respondent’s self-monitoring score.  
TIME = number of minutes spent between the time the respondent completed the first survey and 
purchased his or her last item in the mall (determined by looking at the time on the receipt of the 
consumer’s last purchase).  
INCOME = total annual income of the respondent’s family. Respondents indicated their monthly 
incomes by selecting one of the nine categories (Less than 1,000 TL; 1000 TL - 1,999 TL; 2,000 
TL – 2,999 TL; 3,000 TL – 3,999 TL; 4,000 TL – 4,999 TL; 5,000 TL – 5,999 TL; 6,000 YTL – 
6,999 TL; 7,000 TL – 7,999; More than 8,000 TL ). $1 was approximately 1.2 TL at the time of 
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the study. We created a continuous annual income variable by taking the median income for each 
category and multiplying that number by 12.  
CREDIT = 1 if paid with a credit card, -1 otherwise. 
MIX = 1 if paid with a credit card and cash, -1 otherwise. 
AGE = age of the respondent. 
GENDER = 1 if male and -1 if female.  
INSPECIAL = 1 if took advantage of an in-store special, -1 otherwise. 
VISIT = respondent’s frequency of visiting the mall rated on a seven-point scale (1= not at all 
often, 7= very often).  
IMPULSE= respondent’s buying impulsiveness score. Respondents completed Rook and 
Fisher’s (1995) buying impulsiveness scale, which contains nine seven-point item scales (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The scale includes items such as “I often buy things 
without thinking” and “Sometimes I am a bit of reckless about what I buy” (α = .85). 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR STUDY 2 (ESSAY 1) 
 
 
Our central thesis is that agency and communion orientations result in consumers exhibiting 
differential sensitivity to a friend’s influence during a shopping trip. Since we used gender as a 
proxy for this individual difference in the pilot study and Study 1, we again test whether the 
inclusion of gender (in the place of ACDIF) reveals the same pattern of effects in the sample 
used in Study 2. As expected, we find a significant main friend effect (γ2 = 0.12, p < .05) and 
friend x gender interaction (γ13 = 0.13, p < .05). However, the coefficient on friend x gender x 
self-monitor interaction is neither positive nor significant (γ16 = -0.02, p > .70). Interestingly, the 
results reveal a positive and significant gender x self-monitoring interaction (γ15 = 0.17, p < .05).  
 Second, to correct for a potential sample selection bias arising due to the fact that 
participants were not randomly assigned to the social presence conditions (i.e., alone vs. friend), 
we used the propensity score weighting technique (Hirano and Imbens 2001). That is, when 
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selection of participants for different experimental conditions are based on the observables rather 
than random assignment, it is important to adjust for different distributions of the observed 
characteristics in the treated (i.e., accompanied by a friend) and non-treated (i.e., alone) 
population. This adjustment can be done by weighting the non-treated population by the 
propensity score. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, p.41) define propensity score, p(x), as “the 
conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed 
covariates”. In our case, propensity score is the conditional probability of shopping with a friend 
given a set of covariates including such variables as age and income. Propensity score can be 
estimated using either binary logit or probit model where the dependent variable is being 
accompanied by a friend. We calculated propensity scores for each individual in the sample 
following estimation of a logistic regression including age, ln(income), gender, ACDIF, buying 
impulsiveness score, and self-monitoring score as independent variables. The results of the 
logistic regression show that age is the only significant predictor (β=-0.09, χ2 = 8.68, p<.01) of 
the probability of shopping with a friend for the individuals included in our sample. That is, the 
higher the age of the respondent, the lower the probability of being accompanied by a friend. 
Importantly, the estimated coefficient on ACDIF is insignificant (βcommunion = -0.13, χ2 = 0.15, p > 
0.69), suggesting that agency-communion orientation is not related to the probability of shopping 
with a friend vs. alone. Similarly, when agency and communion scores are entered separately 
into the model, the coefficients on both communion and agency are insignificant (βcommunion =  
-0.02, χ2 = 0.00, p > 0.96; βagency = -0.35, χ2 = 0.65, p > 0.41).  
 The inverse probability weights for the respondents in each group, alone and with a 
friend, are calculated as 1/p(x) and 1/(1-p(x)), respectively. Finally, we re-estimated our model 
with OLS using estimated inverse probability weights. This estimation procedure yields a 
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significant main effect for friend (δ2 = 0.14, p < .05), a positive and significant FRIEND x 
ACDIF interaction (δ14 = 0.25, p < .05), and a positive and significant FRIEND x ACDIF x SM 
interaction (δ17 = 0.32, p < .01). Overall, these results suggest that our findings do not suffer from 
sample selection bias. 
Third, we test the possibility that agentic consumers may want to spend more and bring 
along their friends to the shopping trip to achieve that goal (i.e., licensing argument), whereas the 
opposite may be the case for communal consumers. In order to test this argument, we replace the 
dependent variable in our model with planned spending and reran the regression. However, 
neither the main effect for FRIEND nor the interactions are significant. Another possibility is 
that high ACDIF consumers accompanied by a friend may underreport their planned spending as 
compared to solo high ACDIF consumers. Comparison of mean planned spending between two 
groups reveal no evidence of underreporting (MFriend = 89.31 YTL vs. MAlone = 91.66 YTL, p > 
.90). Finally, we include product category dummies (i.e., apparel, electronics, personal care, 
other (e.g., home textile, books), and mix) to examine whether our results are driven by specific 
product categories. Our results remain unchanged once we control for the types of products 
purchased by consumers.   
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
 
AGENCY-COMMUNION PRIMING FOR STUDY 3 (ESSAY 1) 
 
 
 
 
We are interested in how people form meaningful English sentences. Please form meaningful, non-
question sentences from the following scrambled words. To complete the exercise successfully, you 
need to use all of the words given for each sentence.   
 
Agency  Communion 
Important personal are beliefs. Important social are norms. 
Being ambitious to success is key. Assisting others to happiness is key.  
Control individuals seek to others. Conform with individuals seek to others. 
Usually I on myself focus. Usually I on others focus. 
Achieve aspiring individuals goals their.  Make caring a difference people.  
Virtuous is a quality displaying self-sufficiency. Virtuous is a quality displaying nurturance. 
Convictions I my stand by own. While decisions making thoughts others’ consider I  
Being important a leader is. Being important a follower is. 
Respect get people accomplished.  Respect get people modest.  
Separate individuals are others from. Connected individuals are others to. 
Try assertive to be I. Try selfless to be I. 
Competition enjoyable makes life more.  Cooperation enjoyable makes life more.  
Concern for I have well-being my own.   Concern for I have of others the welfare   
Power people for strive.  Togetherness people for strive.  
Bring happiness alone spending time may. Bring happiness with others spending time may. 
 
Neutral 
Listening to music our minds clear can. 
Exercise a good way to jogging is. 
Events I know college related. 
Daily life a part of technology is.  
Guided by life is knowledge. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONAL MANIPULATION CHECK USED IN STUDY 2 (ESSAY 2) 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
 
STIMULI USED IN STUDY 2 (ESSAY 2) 
 
High Self Benefit Condition 
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Low Self-Benefit Condition 
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